Ind til benet: Hvorfor læser man værker af Schapiro eller andre kunstkyndige? For at få beriget sin faktuelle viden og få indsigt på det æstetiske og æstetikhistoriske plan vel sagtens. Hvad nu med Heidegger? Her ville respekten være for lille, om man havde de samme intentioner. Der er to ligaer. Der er dem, der primært siger noget om noget. Og så er der dem, der siger noget. Heidegger tilhører den sidste kategori. Er det Hegel siger om Kant nu også faktuelt korrekt? Det er da ligegyldigt, for han siger primært sit eget! Er det Kierkegaard siger om Hegel akademisk korrekt, igen en ligegyldighed uden for eksamensværelset, Kierkegaard er ikke sekundærlitterat. Når man siger noget om noget, så kan der jo hurtigt checkes efter, om det nu også har sin rigtighed. Når der slet og ret siges noget, så er korrekthedschecket ikke så lige til [...]. Heidegger går sit eget ærinde, han prøver på noget med disse sko. Det er det, det gælder om at se. Hvis det er fordøjet encyklopædisk viden, man vil have, skal man aldrig gå til Heidegger. Hvis man vil se »vilde« grundlagsrystende spørgsmål folde sig ud derimod…

Skovgaards pointe synes at være, at Heidegger er filosof; hans læsning, formidling og analytiske tekster er alle lige stor en del af den filosofiske skaben, og drejer sig altså ikke så meget om fakta, som det han kommer frem til.

Men Schapiros og for den sags skyld også min kritik begrunder sig ikke i, om Heidegger udfolder en faktuel viden, men derimod i, at Heidegger gennem sin retoriske udvikling af afsnittet og i et øjebliks ekstatisk selvfølgelighed får udsagt de i denne sammenhæng skæbnesvangre ord: "Es wäre die schlimmste selbsttäuschung, wollten wir meinen, unser Beschreiben habe als ein subjektives Tun alles so ausgemalt und dann hineingelegt." Det drejer sig altså ikke om en erkendelse, der er lagt ind i værket, men derimod om dette, at "Ein Seiendes, ein Paar Bauernschuhe, kommt im Werk in das Lichte seines Seins zu stehen."

At stå i sin værens lys vil sige, at sandheden sker som hændelse; sagen selv udfolder sig igennem værket. Det kan selvfølgelig læses derhen, at sandhedens skeen er en retorisk happening, hvor man netop ser sprogets altid nærværende "grundlagsrystende spørgsmål" udfolde sig. Men ... og det mener jeg er et stort men ... Heidegger taler om selvbedrag i forbindelse med sin analyse af bondeskoene og gør det ud fra, at det ikke er Heidegger selv, der ligger en subjektiv erkendelse ind i maleriet, men derimod en læsning af sandhedens skeen i værket, af hvad der er på færde i værket.

Spørgsmålet er nu, og det er her Skovgaard og jeg er uenige, om Heideggers analyse, om overhovedet Heidegger ville kunne tænke uden om sin bukolisme? Anderledes formuleret - ville Heideggers analyse have set lige sådan ud, hvis han havde vist, at van Goghs sko var blevet trådt ud i de parisiske gader? Spørgsmålet er virkeligheden et andet: det selvbedrag som Heidegger retorisk tager i brug er rettet mod eventuelle kritikere af hans analyse, træder det ikke frem og vender sig mod Heidegger selv, idet det selvbedraget skulle få til at tie, kommer til udtryk i billedet selv, da det faktisk ikke har noget som helst med bondesko, men bysko at gøre? Idet Heidegger altså klantrer andre for selvbedrag og taler om en sandhedens skeen, om den ikke-subjektive hændelse i værket, vender værket sig mod Heidegger med en kritik af hans eget selvbedrag, hans egen for-forståelse, hans eget vorweg. Jeg får i den forbindelse lyst til at citere fra Sein und Zeit:

Wenn sich die besondere Konkretion der Auslegung im Sinne der exakten Textinterpretation gern auf das beruft, was "dasteht", so ist das, was zunächst "dasteht", nicht anderes als die selbstverständliche, undiskutierte Vormeinung des Auslegers [...]. (SuZ, s. 150)

Gadamer taler om det samme, når han benytter begrebet fordom, som en nødvendig tilstedeværelse i enhver udlægningssituation - og selvfølgelig kommer vi alle slæbende med vores bagage, men vi skulle gerne, om ikke kunne være objektive, så i hvert fald mindre subjektive. Heidegger siger da også samme sted, at man må være yderst påpasselig med denne Vormeinung, jeg mener så ikke, at Heidegger selv er tilstrækkelig påpasselig, men hans retorik serverer was "dasteht" med en selvfølgelighed, der samtidig er parret med en forsmåelse af enhver kritiker, der måtte turde hæve sin stemme mod mesteren. Til alt held formår van Goghs maleri af malerens egne sko at vende Heideggers kritik mod ham selv.

Tilføjet: man kan måske vove den påstand, at Heideggers Vormeinung fører ham selv bag lyset, dvs. hans bukoliske udblik skaber en rydning i moderniteten, hvori moderniteten først kan sættes i værk som tilbageblik. Udkastenes åbne fremtidighed skriver sig netop op mod Intet, som er enhver skeens mulighed - som kreativ bogføring i selvet: kunne det forklare de forholdsvis aggressive udfald mod enhver tænkt modstander? Det paranoide i hans retorik?

O Colóquio começou com a palestra do Prof. Paulo R. Schneider, com o título Perspectivas da essência da ciência e da técnica, dividida, grosso modo, em quatro partes: (1) Considerações histórico-sociais da filosofia e da ciência no séc. XIX-XX; (2) A relação que Heisenberg estabelece entre ciência, filosofia e arte; (3) A concepção de ciência e técnica no segundo Heidegger; (4) Considerações finais.

(1) A apresentação começa com uma contextualização do final do séc. XIX até metade do séc. XX, período considerado por Schnädelbach o "século da ciência" (Philosophie in Deutschland. 1831-1933). Nessa época, ocorre uma mudança funcional na ciência: comprometendo-se com o processo de industrialização, ela torna-se também uma força produtiva, qual seja, uma forma de processo de pesquisa e tecnologia. Além disso, a ciência desliga-se da filosofia ao reagir contra o pretenso monopólio de cientificidade do idealismo alemão e alcança novos níveis culturais e sociais, "cientificizando" o mundo da vida e mapeando as próprias idéias filosóficas a partir de perspectivas sociológicas. 

(2) A principal pergunta que Heisenberg tentou responder em seu texto Die Bedeutung des Schönen in der exakte Naturwissenschaft (A significação do belo nas ciências exatas) é: "de onde surge a emergência das novas concepções de totalidade nas ciências? de onde surgem as grandes idéias revolucionárias, os grandes paradigmas?" Heisenberg, com isso, tentará aproximar a concepção de beleza ao âmbito das ciências exatas, na medida em que ela torna-se uma ocorrência compreensiva. 

Duas concepções de belo são lembradas por Heisenberg: a primeira é a determinação do belo como exata correspondência de todas as parte em um totalidade determinada; a segunda provém de Plotino, que definia a beleza como o transluzir eterno do Uno na aparição material. 

A primeira concepção encontra-se presente desde a Escola Pitagórica até a teoria da relatividade. Pitágoras é o grande teórico aqui, já que sua filosofia reuniu a estrutura matemática como fonte de beleza harmônica e, ainda, como o princípio explicativo e compreensivo de todo o ser (a arché) - um princípio formal ideal de relação matemática. 

A partir dessa relação tríplice, Heisenberg percorrerá Platão, Galileu, Kepler, Newton e os físicos da teoria da relatividade e da teoria quântica. A questão recorrente agora é: "como se explica que por meio de um súbito, brilhante e belo surgimento teórico apareça a compreensão de um grande conjunto teórico bem antes que se possa prová-lo em detalhes?". Desta dúvida, Heisenberg direciona-se para sua segunda concepção de belo, tentando mostrar a pré-existência de uma capacidade original para reconhecermos modelos fundamentais - aqui, os arquétipos de Jung e Pauli são examinados. 

Por fim, P. Schneider apresenta os pressupostos fundamentais de física de Heisenberg, centralizados no conceito de "energia". O ser humano, com isso, passa a ser visto como reconhecendo-se a sim mesmo em cada detalhe a partir do todo conjugado da civilização ocidental em possível evolução; ele pode contemplar o belo a partir de uma objetivação compreensiva de uma totalidade objetiva, em que o homem reconhece a sua produção e, ao mesmo tempo, a si mesmo.

(3) A exposição de Heidegger concentra-se no artigo Wissenschaft und Besinnung (Ciência e meditação ou pensamento de sentido, segundo a tradução da Vozes), que encontramos em Ensaios e conferências. Schneider ressalta a dificuldade em lermos os textos heideggerianos sobre a ciência, uma vez que o autor transita constantemente entre os genitivos subjetivo e objetivo - deixando ao leitor o esforço da interpretação. Por exemplo, a definição "A ciência é a teoria do real" pode ser vista (1) como uma teoria sobre o real, que investiga o que é objetivamente real (aqui temos o genitivo objetivo); ou (2) como uma teoria envolvida desde sempre por aquilo que é real e que, portanto, está no comando efetivo e nunca pode ser conhecido completamente (genitivo subjetivo). Nesse sentido, o uso comum do genitivo objetivo por nós recebe uma nova inversão, dando-lhe uma dimensão de profundidade, na qual somos levados a aceitar o genitivo subjetivo como o determinante. Algo outro, afirma Heidegger, domina a ciência e permanece encoberto, sem que ela sequer passa perto.  Por exemplo, na física, a Natureza é o elemento incontornável com o qual o cientista não consegue alcançar sua essência a partir da representação científica; na psiquiatria, é o Dasein humano; na ciência histórica, é a historicidade; na filologia, é a linguagem. Portanto, a inacessibilidade do incontornável marca a própria essência da ciência, é seu traço fundamental. 

Meditação (Besinnung) torna-se, então, precisamente, a atividade de se dar conta da situação em que se está, um deixar-se envolver pelo sentido. E aqui, ao se referir ao pensamento grego, Heidegger vincula-o ao surgimento da ciência e da técnica moderna, a partir de sua tese sobre a história do esquecimento do ser. Como resultado, Heidegger considera os gregos como o (único) ponto de partida da meditação.

(4) Em suas considerações finais, Schneider ressalta a refutação da idéia de causalidade por Heidegger, uma vez que a facticidade do porquê da causalidade não explica causalmente o porquê. E, aceitando esta categoria, o homem também objetifica-se, pois a explicação de si mesmo já é antecipada por uma explicação causal. Também daqui Heisenberg não conseguiu escapar.

As discussões que se realizaram após a apresentação tiveram, em grande parte, a intenção de perceber a insuficiência do diagnóstico realizado por Heidegger sobre a ciência e a técnica, na medida em que ele situa-as em uma dimensão inalcançável, do inefável, etc. Se assim fosse, o próprio trabalho da filosofia estaria dissolvido a nada, pois não haveria qualquer espaço para troca de razões e contra-razões.

I am taking a class this semester called "faith and reason" and we are exploring the relationship between truth, rationality, and faith. The first book we read for the class was Christian existentialist-theologian-philosopher Paul Tillich's The Dynamics of Faith. In this work, Tillich provides an existentialist definition of faith that I believe is compatible with atheism. How is this possible? Allow me to elucidate on Tillich's refreshing idea.

Tillich essentially defines faith as an "ultimate concern with the infinite[or unconditional. I prefer "infinite."]". Thus, if you are an atheist you can still have "faith" granted that you are ultimately concerned with something that is not finite. What does this seemingly mystic definition mean? Surely, it is too abstract and mystical to be of any relevance to a scientifically oriented atheist such as myself (that, granted, has many philosophical leanings) What does Tillich mean here?

First of all, in order to understand what Tillich means by faith, it is important to understand what he doesn't mean. He doesn't equate faith with a cognitive belief structure or propositional knowledge-based faith, such as "I believe in God because I have faith that God exists." This is not true faith for Tillich because only the cognitive aspect of the human being is concerned in such a faith. As an existentialist, this is unacceptable because "ultimate concern" deals with the total personality and not just a limited aspect of the human being, namely theoretical and reflective cognition.

Utilizing Heideggerian terminology, I think ultimate concern can be conceptualized in terms of ontological comportment by a Dasein. That is to say, as ontologically oriented creatures, human beings comport themselves towards that which defines their being, which is their own individual existence. I am a life to live. Such a conception of humanity differs from the Cartesian tradition's emphasis on self-consciousness and mental gymnastics, instead focusing on how we are engaged with the world in our own personal lives. Furthermore, we care about our lives: our being is an issue for us and in this sense, Tillich seems to be echoing Heidegger in his insistence that the most critical aspect of our total personality is our ultimate concern with the infinite.

So what is the infinite if not some metaphysically abstract mumbojumbo? Well, ultimately its a metaphor so take it as you will, but I think its useful to view the infinite in terms of the reductionist/holist debate. I see the infinite as that which can't be reduced to the finite, i.e. the infinite is wrapped up in that which can only be captured in holistic vocabulary. Such as what? Well, for one, our ontological being, which is social in nature, can't be reduced to the physical motions of matter which supports our constitution, but rather, resides in an existential matrix that is spread out ontologically amongst a community of involved and engaged language users. It is this matrix which provides the significance missing in crudely naturalistic conceptions of the human world.

So, the infinite, is transcendent in that it goes above and beyond the concrete realm holistically, but nevertheless, remains grounded in the physicality of reality. It is this conception of infinite that I think is useful for the atheist in coming to terms with Tillich's existentialist theology.

So how does an atheist utilize Tillich's definitions to provide existential perspective to his life? Well, for starters, one can appreciate that mostly everyone is ultimately concerned with something, whether that something is a child, their work, or a nation/idea/etc. However, for Tillich, all these concerns are idolatrous in that they aren't concerned with the infinite. How does Tillich get around this? Well, as a Christian he is concerned with the religious symbolism of God as an unconditional infinite Ground of Being. While I can make this work in my own mind, I fear that in our day and age, such terminology will never be socially useful because it would be annoying to try and explain in existentialist terms what you mean by "ultimate ground of being" everytime you mention that you have faith in God. So what should a good philosopher-atheist do? Take the Heideggerian path: situate your ultimate concern in terms of what you are already concerned with as an ontological being: your own being, your own life and how you live it, engaged and embodied in the world.

[To be continued]

118 - De onde nossas considerações tomam sua importância, desde que parecem destruir tudo o que é interessante, isto é, tudo o que é grande e importante? (Como em todas as construções, na medida em que deixam sobrando montes de pedras e escombros.) Mas são apenas castelos de areia que destruímos, e liberamos o fundamento da linguagem sobre o qual repousavam.

119 - Os resultados da filosofia consistem na descoberta de um simples absurdo qualquer e nas contusões que o entendimento recebeu ao correr de encontro às fronteiras da linguagem. Elas, as contusões, nos permitem reconhecer o valor dessa descoberta.

A mesma questão é dirigida a Blanchot no livro de Marlène Zarader, O Ser e o Neutro a partir de Maurice Blanchot. Afinal Blanchot fala de um evento que advém e me arrebata a subjetividade, desfaz minha identidade em poeira. Mas até que ponto, questiona, se pode perder a possibilidade mesma de um retorno ao registro anterior do sujeito, ao seu mundo ? O irrefreável e irreconhecível não é esse incessante? Mas o incessante em Blanchot remete à autre nuit ou ao dia inexorável?

Vamos ver.

Her indsættes en dikotomi mellem det ægte og det afledte, konstruktet som afledt i forhold til det faktiske, men man er endnu ikke sikker på valoriseringen i dikotomien. Og dog ... på bekostning, hedder det, noget falder bort, hvilket vil sige, at det afledte, konstruktet, opstår gennem en amputeret helhed ...

Endnu et problem: hvorfor vægtes helheden i kommentaren øjensynligt højere en delen?

... hvorfor det næppe længere kan tænkes som en helhed. Helheden er vel absolut. Men er man dermed ikke lige præcis tilbage ved en autenticitetstænkning, en sandhedsmetafysik,

Fortsættelsen gør det ikke bedre, men etablerer sig negativt på en dikotomi, som kun øjensynligt fjernes, men egentlig danner det ny grundlag for kommenteringen.

en form forguddommeligt vanvid, et inspireret klarsyn - en ekstatisk hændelse, Heideggers Ereignis - blot et nyt ord for romantikernes anelse.

... og dermed mister sin konkretisering. Omvendt kan man vel sige, at allerede det faktiske var et konstrukt, noget til-egnet, og dermed falder hele sproget sammen som værende en konstruktionshelhed, der umuligt kan tænkes kritisk ud fra, men den faktiske virkelighed er altid allerede gennemsiet dette konstrukt. Er det da ikke umuligt at tænke lidt længere væk?

Og dog fungerer det. Sproget. Hele tiden.

En fortærsket mulighed fremkastes.

Det mister sin kraft i det omfang det underlægges en overvejelse, fordi det tages på ordet. Vi er nok engang tilbage ved, D&G ved drømmen om at kunne sige 'jeg' uden, at det er vigtigt.

En fagterminologisk defineret tale er ikke mere præcis en anden slags tale, men blot defineret ved en mere uoverskuelig metafysik. Uoverskuelig, fordi den tror sig mere neutral. Uoverskuelig. som udgangspunkt. Nej! At turde tale midt i sproget.

endlich: "deutsche Wanderer sind öfter, in kleineren Gruppen und auf neuen Wegen unterwegs. [...Auch] würden sich nach wie vor 57 Prozent der Deutschen als Wanderer bezeichnen, 55 Prozent seien von Frühjahr bis Herbst sogar mehrere Male im Monat unterwegs - vor vier Jahren hatten das nur 44 Prozent angegeben. Jeder dritte Wanderer sei jetzt sogar im Winter mehrmals monatlich unterwegs."

Das ist ein Anstieg, wie ihn sonst nur Oskars Partei verzeichnen kann! Enorm! Trendsetting! Und man reduziert seinen carbon footprint!! Unterstützt den Mehodornverein! Von dem mir unlängst eine Angestelle stolz erzählte, dass es zu den Großleistungen des Konzerns gehöre, den Abbau von 250.000 Stellen so gut hinbekommen zu haben. Fand das zu krass, um es nachzurecherchieren. Scheinbar gibt es noch andere Kategorien in der Berechnung von Erfolg. Aber zurück zum Thema:
Nähe zur Natur, nah an der Heimat: Wanderland Deutschland!!! (Und dabei noch etwas Philosophie schnuppern... Todtnauberg sehen und glücklich sein.)

spiegel online

malle is dead, long live the black forest!

TULISAN ini bukan hendak menyaingi acara-acara mistis yang ditayangkan televisi maupun surat kabar yang menyuguhkan tentang itu. Saya dengan tulisan ini cuma sekedar membuka realitas, bahwa yang disebut mistis bukan hanya yang supranatural, bukan hanya yang ada di “luar alam” kita, atau yang bersifat irasional dsb; akan tetapi persoalan keseharian hidup manusia pun sebenarnya mistis.

Awalnya saya mengira bahwa hidup bukan sebuah persoalan. Namun ketika suatu hari direnungkan nampak sebuah persoalan yang jelimet alias tak terungkap secara rasional. Hal ini terasa hingga saya beranggapan bahwa hidup tidak lebih dari lingkaran yang kembali dari awal ke akhir dan kembali lagi ke awal, lalu ke akhir dan begitu seterusnya. Siklus ini yang terasa pada keseharian saya dan mungkin juga yang lainnya. Bangun pagi, mandi, makan, beraktivitas (sekolah atau kerja), bersantai, ngobrol dan akhirnya tidur. esoknya kembali seperti semula. Inilah dimensi hidup yang “menghidupkan” sekaligus “mematikan”, karena senantiasa memunculkan hal yang sama dan terulang kembali.

Saya pusing dengan hal di atas, hingga suatu ketika tidak dapat berbuat apa-apa selain tidak tahu--saking mistisnya. Namun apa yang saya alami dan rasakan, ternyata dialami dan dirasakan pula oleh seseorang yang bernama Martin Heidegger, seorang filsuf eksistensialisme Jerman, yang katanya tidak atheis seperti Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus dll.

Heidegger dilahirkan di kota Messkirch pada 26 September 1889 dan wafat tahun 1976. Ia dikisahkan pernah terlibat dengan Gereja Katolik sekaligus menjadi pendukung Nazisme-Hitler. Juga seorang profesor yang disenangi mahasiswinya yang bernama Hannah Arendt (filusuf politik besar yang hidup 1906-1975) yang kemudian terjadilah perselingkuhan cinta dengannya. Bahkan karena mahasiswi itulah Heidegger rela membuat puisi-puisi yang kemudian diberikan sebagai tanda cintanya. Karena takut mengalami bentrokan keluarga, Heidegger yang tua pergi ke sebuah tempat yang jauh dari peradaban kota dan menetap di pondok Todtnaw-Berg.

Di tempat sepi inilah ia menghabiskan waktu-kesehariannya dalam keheningan. Dari tempat itu Heidegger menghasilkan karya Sein und Zeit, sebuah karya yang berbicara perkara keseharian yang ia alami, sakit, takut, cemas, terasing, bahagia dll. Isi yang menarik pada buku itu adalah persoalan eksistensi dan kecemasan. Menurutnya kecemasan adalah proses untuk masuk pada eksistensi diri yang ada dan ketiadaan sebenarnya tak ada, karena yang sesungguhnya disebut tiada adalah penampakan dari yang disebut ada. Dari ketiadaan itulah yang menunjukan ke-ada-an dalam ketidaknampakan di dalam waktu, dan itu sebabnya waktu dan ke-ada-an yang dikemukakan Martin Heidegger dianggap sebagai proses untuk "hidup" dalam keberadaan yang nampak, atau mencoba menikmati apa yang sesungguhnya telah hadir dan nampak pada hidup kita.

Apakah ini yang disebut (theology) predestination yang kerap menelantarkan manusia untuk tetap tinggal dalam keberadaanya; seada-adanya, sa-ayana? Jika ini yang dimaksudkannya, maka tak salah lagi bila sikap pasif dan disprogressif adalah menjadi jargon-jargon yang sengaja dihidupkan. Dan tentunya bila ini diterima maka hidup bukan lagi sebagai dinamika, tetapi stagnasi yang mau tak mau harus diterima--sebab takdir adalah otoritas sang tiran untuk berbuat jahat dan dalih si bodoh bagi kegagalannya, begitu kata Amborse Bierce (1842 - 1914).

Benarkah Heidegger menganjurkan hidup demikian? Eksistensi bukan insistensi. Itu sebabnya manusia senantiasa mengatasi dirinya sendiri dengan transendensi atas dirinya sendiri atau sebuah upaya memahami yang berdasar pada masa silam, keseharian dan rencana ke depan. Dengan cara itu hidup senantiasa diatasi dengan membuat transendensi atas ke-ada-annya. Inilah eksistensialisme Heidegger yang mencoba menentukan faktisitas sebagai bingkai bergeraknya eksistensi, yang seakan-akan terlempar di dunia karena bukan hasil penentuan sendiri. Ini pula yang menjadi alasan bagi semua interfretator yang ingin menghadirkan semua bentuk pengalaman–pengalaman lain.

Di sini Heidegger sebenarnya mewartakan bahwa pemahaman (verstehen) bukan sekedar peristiwa kejiwaan, akan tetapi suatu proses ontologis, yaitu “penguakkan” (mukasyafah) atas pelbagai hal. Di sini sudah ada ikhtiar untuk berada dalam suatu jaringan keseluruhan yang saling menunjuk atau memungkinkan terbukanya "sesuatu" yang dilihat sebagai "ini" atau sebagai "itu". Keterbukaan inilah yang disebutnya verstehen, yang terutama bermula dari vorhabe (yang sudah dipunyai sebelumnya), vorsicht (yang sudah dilihat sebelumnya) dan vorgrieff (dan yang sudah ditangkap sebelumnya).

Karena itulah Heidegger memahami manusia sebagai makhluk yang tidak pernah hidup di masa kini, tapi juga dari masa lalu hingga ingin ke masa depan. Manusia yang hidup di masa kini senantiasa berada antara masa silam dan masa depan.Yang dipenuhi dengan rencana dan kemungkinan-kemungkinan yang dipikirkan untuk sampai pada hakikat manusia itu sendiri. Jadi eksistensi bukan insistensi adalah cara berada khas manusia. Artinya manusia bukan sebagaimana benda yang berada di dalam dirinya sendiri, tetapi berada untuk ke luar dari dirinya; dan sekaligus bisa mengatasi dirinya dengan menciptakan dan membuat transendensi atas dirinya sendiri. Maka dari itu bentangkanlah cita-cita, harapan dan mimpi--walaupun itu cuma rencana.

Heidegger memang murid Edmund Husserl yang tidak melanjutkan kerja gurunya. Malah kembali pada proyek Immanuel Kant yang belum selesai tentang das sein manusia. "Saya darimana? Kemana saya? Saya ini apa sebenarnya? "—adalah pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang bersifat das sein, berada-di sini-sekarang sebagai makhluk hidup.

Karena persoalan di atas merupakan tentang eksistensi manusia, maka Heidegger membagi dua yang disebut eksistensi : yang asli dan bukan asli, yang rendah dan bukan rendah, atau yang wajar dan bukan wajar. Contohnya adalah kejatuhan Adam dan Hawa setelah berdosa dan jatuh dalam eksistensi yang bukan asli karena kejatuhan dalam tempat yang bukan dari sebelumnya yang bermakna rendah, atau keterlemparan dari yang asali.1) Di sinilah faktisitas manusia ibarat batu yang dilemparkan ke dalam empang dan batu itu tidak tahu dimana ia mengadanya.

Maka di sini das sein harus diupayakan untuk bisa mengada dari keterlemparannya itu melaui, atau dengan menciptakan sesuatu yang mendahului wujud (dalam kemaujudannya). Sebab setiap pilihan dan usaha menjadi wujud akan senantiasa ber-relasi dengan pelbagai kemungkinan-kemungkinan dan tidak akan pernah melebihi dari kemungkinan-kemungkinan itu (yang ada atau yang diciptakan sebelumnya). Dengan kata lain, Heidegger menghendaki untuk mendahulukan "diri" dengan mengada dalam dunia--karena das sein merupakan hal untuk mengada di dunia.

Selain hal di atas, menurut M.A.W. Brouwer, dalam pemikiran Heidegger ada yang terpenting yaitu waktu (zeit). Sebab menurutnya bahwa persoalan usaha (sorge) dalam analisa eksistensial Heidegger merupakan kesatuan struktur dari das sein; dan hal yang mendasar dalam das sein adalah waktu.

Persoalan tentang waktu, bagi Heidegger, ada kaitannya dan berujung dengan persoalan mati. Dari mati itulah ia berpandangan bahwa das sein bermula dan berakhir pada mati; dan karena mati itulah yang mengkabarkan ketidak-mengada-an manusia dari mengadanya manusia; yang sekaligus bermakna sebagai finalitas esesnsial dari hidup manusia. Maka dari sini kemudian lahir gejala "takut mati".

Dengan ketakutan inilah manusia senantiasa akan berusaha menjadikan dirinya (sanggup) untuk menjadi manusia. Dari persoalan mati (tersebut) pula dikatakan bahwa masalah (waktu) retensi dan protensi akan mepersatukan dalam keseluruhan eksistensi manusia. Misalnya orang hadir (atau yang membaca tulisan ini) adalah yang bermula dari sebelum sekarang (membaca tulisan ini) dan setelah sekarang (membaca tulisan ini). Pendeknya, keberadaan (sekarang) adalah waktu kemarin dan yang akan datang yang berada dalam keberadaan kita sebagai makhluk yang mengada. Dan mati merupakan titik capai dari apa-apa yang dikerjakan, dilakukan dan direncanakannya, adalah menjadi penyebab dari apa yang telah diupayakan hingga mewujud dalam eksistensi manusia otentik.

Atas konsepsi tersebut dapat dimengerti kenapa "mati" tidak dianggap sesuatu yang menakutkan bagi orang-orang yang merasa dirinya telah melakukan "pengorbanan" sebagai bukti dari ke-mengadaan-nya sesuatu (yang diyakininya). Konsepsi inilah dalam Islam-Syi`ah disebut dengan syahadah--yang telah banyak dibuktikan, salahsatunya Imam Husein, seorang cucu Rasulullah Saww yang berani menjemput kematian di padang Karbala, Irak (abad tujuh masehi).

Jadi, takut (angst) dan mati (tot) merupakan salah satu syarat yang wajib ada pada manusia untuk membawa dirinya pada eksistensi Yang-otentik. Ini pula yang membedakan Heidegger dengan Nietzsche.2) Bagi Neitzsche, takut adalah sesuatu yang harus dikuasai atau dikendalikan dengan mengatakan "ya"—sebagai bentuk penyatuan antara "harapan" yang berbenturan dengan "kenyataan".

Dengan inilah Nietzsche sadar bahwa tidak ada yang disebut progresifitas (yang dikoarkan kaum modernism); sebab yang nampak adalah kembalinya segala sesuatu (sirkular an-sich). Ini yang dikatakan Heidegger bahwa, Nietzsche masih "keranjingan" dengan kehendak untuk berkuasa agar dapat mempertahankan otentisitasnya. Agar bisa keluar dari masalah di atas, Heidegger menyarankan untuk melakukan transendensi. Tetapi bagi saya, dengan merujuk fenomena-eksistensial keseharian, ia terlalu cepat mengambil kesimpulan sehingga hal-hal kecil yang terjadi dalam keseharian digeneralisir sebagai lingkaran tak bermakna (nihilsm).

Padahal bila kita teliti dengan cermat, bahwa tidak ada sesuatu yang sama/mirip pada dua saat yang berbeda. Artinya, dalam setiap pergeseran manusia dalam ruang-waktu, baik itu peristiwa dan kejadian-kejadian yang dialami manusia, meskipun terlihat sirkular atau mengulang-ulang yang pernah dialami, akan tetapi pada tiap-tiap perulangannya itu ada "hal-hal" yang membedakannya dengan yang dialami sebelumnya. Atau senantiasa ada yang bersifat "unik/khas" dalam setiap perulangannya itu. Atas landasan ini, bila hal-hal yang "khas/unik" ini disadari adanya dan kemudian dijadikan sebagai "nilai-nilai", maka dengan uapaya terus-menerus akan sampai/menuju eksistensi Yang-Sejati.

Demikian tuturan saya tentang Heidegger, yang secara keseharian terasa ada benarnya dalam hidup yang kita arungi. Namun terlepas dari kebenaran itu, atau tepatnya pada Heidegger yang berupaya maksimal untuk mengatasi diri dari keterasingan, ketakutan dan kesia-siaan dengan sikap pasrah-aktif yang dilakukannya melalui antisipasi dengan pelbagai rencana atau membuat transendensi-diri. Tetapi di sisi lain tergusur pada sisi terlemparnya "diri" dari realitas sosial.

Memang di sini harus ada upaya kembali untuk menuntaskan sisi yang belum tersentuh oleh Heidegger. Karena persoalan keseharian dan keberadaan manusia adalah senantiasa menuntut solusi yang tuntas. Akan tetapi dari upaya ketuntasan itu seringkali menyisakan keterlenaan atas hal-hal yang pelik dan bahkan bisa melebar dan meluas. Ini mungkin siklus yang tidak akan cepat selesai dan berakhir dengan tarekah-polah manusia agar bisa keluar dari siklus tersebut.

Untuk itu, memang diperlukan semacam alat dan antisipasi agar tidak terulang-kembalinya ke sisi keterlemparan (manusia) dari sisi sosial, sejarah maupun budaya—seperti Heidegger yang menyisihkan dirinya dari kehidupan ramai ke tempat yang sepi, pondok Todtnaw-Berg.

Di sana Heidegger memang menghasilkan refleksi yang mendalam (dalam bentuk karya)—tetapi ia bukan Nabi Muhammad Saww yang setelah tenggelam-merenung di gua Hira dan mendapatkan pencerahan, yang segera membereskan persoalan hidup, kemelut sosial dan kemanusiaan (Arab) hingga berhasil mencerahkan masyarakat.

Akhirnya, saya sendiri tidak tahu harus bagaimana menyelesaikan masalah tersebut. Atau jangan-jangan, saya lah yang tidak tahu apa yang terkandung di dalam pikiran-pikiran Heidegger. Atas inilah saya ingin mengakhiri tulisan ini dengan mengutip salahsatu kalamullah;: janganlah kamu mengikuti apa yang tidak sampai pengetahuanmu ke sana, karena sesungguhnya pendengaran, penglihatan dan perasaan; semuanya itu akan di minta pertanggungan jawabnya (QS. Al-Isra : 36).

AHMAD SAHIDIN,
Mantan Wartawan Majalah Swadaya

CATATAN akhir :
1) Tentang Adam ini ada penjelasan yang menarik dari Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938). Menurutnya, Adam bukanlah individu yang terlempar karena dosa, tetapi ia adalah symbol dari konsep manusia sadar-diri. Artinya, kejatuhan Adam adalah bermakna peralihan (mengalir) dari tingkat naluriah primitive (yang terpenjara) menuju ke tingkat kesadaran-diri yang merdeka dengan tetap dapat mengalami keraguan dan keingkaran yang manusiawi. Kondisi Adam inilah yang membuktikan bahwa manusia tidak sempurna—sehingga ia senantiasa untuk berada dalam proses menuju/menjadi sempurna. Demikian dengan hal yang bersifat keseharian, kata Iqbal, kita sepatutnya menghubungkan diri dengan lingkungan materiil untuk meningkatkan diri yang sejati; yang terkait dengan siapa aku sebenarnya melalui kehendak-kreatif, atau refleksi yang mendalam hingga sadar dan tahu bahwa ada yang Lebih-Mahasempurna. Lihat Oliver Leaman, Pengantar Filsafat Islam (Bandung: Mizan, 2002) halaman 35; dan Donny Gahrial Adian, Muhammad Iqbal (Jakarta: Teraju, 2003) halaman 83.

2) Nietzsche dianggap orang yang berpengaruh kepada Hiedegger sekaligus menjadi inspirasi dari beberapa gagasan eksistensialisme; yang sampai-sampai memberikan ulasan yang bernasdan berilian, dalam bentuk seperti (1) Nietzsche :The Will to Power as Art; (2) Nietzsche : The Eternal Resurrence of Same; (3) Nietzsche :The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics; (4) Nietzsche : Nihilsm. Mengenai Nietzsche, ada yang menarik darinya yaitu tentang teriakan: " Gott Ist Tot!". Adalah teriakan yang menggumamkan "kematian" atas apa yang manusia modern agungkan seperti rasionalitas, logika, ide-ide progresif dll; yang seringkali dijadikan segalanya bagi manusia modern sudah tidak ada apa-apanya lagi. Dalam hal ini Nietzsche menggunakan metafor "Tuhan" untuk menunjuk apa-apa yang dijadikan pegangan dan jaminan oleh manusia modern. Dikarenakan di dalam sejarahnya "Tuhan" tersebut telah menimbulkan krisis yang menyeluruh, maka ia teriak: "Tuhan Telah Mati"—yang gantikan dengan "nihilsm". Artinya, paradigma abad modern sudak tidak laku lagi karena ada kekurangan-kekurangan yang mendasar. Di sini ia telah berjasa dalam mengadakan refleksi filsafat yang mendalam, meskipun menghina metafisika, rasionalitas, kebenaran, dan bahkan menertawakan ilmu pengetahuan. Ia hanya percaya pada satu kebenaran, yaitu "tidak ada kebenaran"—karena segalanya hanya interpretasi dan perspektif. Lihat dan baca karya St. Sunardi, Nietzsche (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001).

Sobre la vida de Ernst Tugendhat, ver articulo en Wikipedia (ingles).

Para listado de libros en castellano de Ernst Tugendhat ver: Bibliografía

Do not become anxious, you German republicans; the German revolution will not take place more pleasantly and gently for having been preceded by the Kantian critique, Fichtean transcendental idealism, or even natural philosophy. Through these theories revolutionary forces have built up which only await the day on which they may break loose, filling the world with horror and awe. Kantians will appear who want nothing to do with mercy even in the phenomenal world; they will plough up without pity the very soil of our European life with sword and axe, in order to eradicate every last root of the past. . . Armed Fichteans will arise, whose fanaticism of will can be restrained neither through fear nor through self-interest. . . More terrible than all will be the natural philosophers, who will participate actively in any German revolution, identifying themselves with the very work of destruction.

If the hand of the Kantian strikes swift and sure because his heart is not moved by any traditional reverence; if the Fichtean courageously defies all danger because for him it does not exist in reality; so the natural philosopher will be terrible, for he has allied himself to the primal forces of nature. He can conjure up the demonic powers of ancient German pantheism and that lust for battle that we find among the Germans will flame within him. — Heinrich Heine, History of Philosophy and Religion in Germany (1832)

What does it mean to be a fascist? The modern understanding of it is contemptible. Dr. Lawrence Britt, for example, sees fascism as equivalent with capitalism, a robust military, moral traditionalism, and patriotism. Like many leftists today, there is still, seventy years later, a desperate, frantic urge to deny the National Socialist German Workers Party was something that was socialist, German, and working class in character.

Martin Heidegger, like many of the 20th century’s most important thinkers, became a proponent of a totalitarian political agenda. Heidegger signed his letters with "Heil Hitler!" He proudly wore a Swastika pin. Heidegger even gave his classes the Nazi salute at the end of lectures. Even more strange was how Heidegger’s philosophy expressed itself through some of his most brilliant students, including Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse — all of whom were Jewish. Heidegger, like Nietzsche, is highly venerated among the New Left.

Richard Wolin, in Heidegger’s Children, begins by looking at the state of Jews in Germany. Jews had assimilated in Germany better than any place in the world, and many were secular individuals. No longer in ghettos, German Jews were emancipated, acculurated, and assimilated. Over 120,000 German Jews enlisted to fight in World War I. The cosmopolitan ideal of Wilhelm von Humboldt and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe seemed alive and well. What happened to Germany?

First of all, there was a general turn against reason, science, technology, and liberalism. Wolin interestingly does not touch upon works like Marx’s Zur Judenfrage. Marx told us not to examine the essence of the religious Jew, but the worldly Jew. Marx explained that the secular basis of Jewry is self-interest, his religion is huckstering, and his God is money. As Marx concluded, "In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Jewry." The rants of Hugo Chavez, the latest socialist hope, ring true the secular Jew as a symbol for everything progressives hate– cosmopolitanism, globalization, capitalism, worldliness, mobility, and inauthenticity.

Heidegger’s philosophy shares this anti-modern outlook. Heidegger picked it up as a student of Catholic theology before he abandoned his faith. Heidegger’s mature philosophy spawned out of the work of Husserl, and is closer to it than many thinkers assume. Instead of analyzing parts of consciousness into its fundamentals and finding the universal in man’s experience, Heidegger took our pre-analytical immediate experience of being-in-the-world as his — if we’re not allowed to call it a foundation — starting point.

Individualism for Heidegger was a false standard of life. Judging is a species of unliving– authentic lived experience is better. Heidegger emphasized our community, our existence as a Volk, and insisted we existed in blood and soil. Previous thinkers supposedly made a critical error, and man become lost in a general, indifferent universal culture. Nietzsche hated this "Jewification of Europe" and supposedly debunked democracy, morality, religion, and humanism for all time. People began to see the authentic, creative self was the new source of value in the world. The searching for the new, chasing the almighty dollar– was the ultimate expression of the evil theyself. America, supposedly a technological Moloch, crushed the temporality and singularity of the here-and-now. Secular Jews, seen as parasites on other cultures, were regarded as having no culture of their own. The only solution, as the composer Richard Wagner put it, would have to be their total annihilation.

Hannah Arendt was once Heidegger’s mistress and defended Heidegger of charges of being a fascist until the very end. In Arendt’s interpretation, totalitarianism is caused by modernity. Bureaucrats kill from a distance, removed from the consequences of their acts, while goons mindlessly follow orders. Evil is not radical, but banal, like an Eichmann doing what he is told. (In reality, Eichmann, a psychopath, was anything but banal.) This theory ignores many things, including the idiosyncratic features of German fascism. It also does not explain why many modern societies, like Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and so forth never become totalitarian. Instead, Arendt offered recycled Heideggerian fears about modernism making people lonely and easy pawns of specialists in control of huge technical apparatuses. In addition, instead of advocating a minimal, liberal state, Arendt preached political existentialism, seeking Nietzsche’s great politics.

Karl Löwith’s response to Heidegger was one of stoicism. Heidegger’s error in Löwith’s mind was confusing the world with the human world– Löwith, influenced by the Orient, advocated accepting the cosmological eternity as it is. Both views reject instrumental reason, and write off human achievements — the eradication of slavery, universal suffrage, increased longevity, widespread literacy, and so forth. Both had little use for the bloodless intellect, and focused on primal experiences instead.

Hans Jonas, seeing life as having intrinsic value, became a rabid environmentalist. As a soldier in the second World War and the Israeli war for independence, the deprivations of battle drew him away from looking at reality in discrete elements. Being supposedly informs us what we owe it, and man is threatening the world with technology. Jonas wrote that we needed a heuristics of fear, and that we should keep industrial risk-taking and experimentation at a minimum. In reality, the devastation of the earth does not inhere in the idea or practice of capitalism and technology. Rural third world countries and socialist do-gooder People’s States have had much, much, much worse environmental records than capitalist and technologically advanced countries like Japan. Most importantly, by worshiping mere survival, Jonas misses the good life, which includes excellence, friendship, and the production of goods, not bads. Contrary to what environmentalist wackos preach, only socialist societies collapse into primitivism with the obligatory mass poverty, mass starvation, and mass murder.

Herbert Marcuse is the man who singlehandedly Heideggerized the left. Capitalism turned millions of proletarians into proprietors, creating a crisis for Marxist intellectuals. Along with Lukacs and Gramsci, Marcuse interpreted Marxism to be a critique of reification. Capitalism makes us judge people in categories, instead of accepting people who they are. Our tools end up controlling us, not the other way around. As a result, radical social transformation must be self-transformation– and labor should be geared toward self-realization, self-enrichment, and play. Like Heidegger, Marcuse saw the helpless masses dominated by false needs only a dictatorship of intellectuals could cure.

Wolin, due to his leftist commitments, couldn’t spell out what this all entails today. One, identity politics. Groups from feminazis to homosexuals to illegal aliens believe they deserve special considerations not enumerated in the Constitution because of the authenticity of their commitment and their way of life. Secondly, we’ve seen the veneration of the primal. The stone-age primitives who lived on this continent are praised as paragons of virtue, and productive industries are attacked daily. Third, we’ve seen anti-technological environmentalist fear-mongering. Prophets like Paul Ehrlich have predicted that civilization would collapse under starvation by the 1980s. Jimmy Carter said if we didn’t switch completely to alternative fuels by 1990, America would be without energy. Even today, we hear tinfoil paranoia from everything from the economic race to the bottom to peak oil, and few dare question it, since activists are authentic, committed, and therefore are in a state of grace. Lastly, the anti-West stuff owes much to Heidegger’s style of thinking. George Bush was seen as a robot, following orders of technocrat capitalists, oppressing poor terrorists who only wanted to have peaceful thoughts about the sand. That terrorists strap bombs to their kids and fly planes into skyscrapers only proves the authenticity of their being-toward-death.

In short, Heidegger, like his followers today, ended up supporting a caricature of the Western tradition he claimed to hate. While socialists are what Reinhold Niebuhr called children of the light, good intentions with bad results– fascists are children of the dark– the pursue chaos and the irrational for the sake of it. Instead of the bloodless intellect, they preferred primal experiences. Instead of the diversity of the marketplace, they sought a unified Volk. Instead of supporting traditional viewpoints, fascism reacted against the tradition– they believed we could will our own destiny only if we had enough resolve.

As long as, in the face of rational argument, people make touchy politically correct demands on others to respect their diversity, culture, and authencity, Heidegger will continue to haunt us.

There is one difference however and that is that I am not in my room typing away tonight, or this morning if you prefer, I'm in Jessie's computer room typing away. She's sound asleep and here I sit, as I usually do, on her computer furthering my geeky behavior. There are many things that I like about being here at night while she's sleeping, the overall situation is very...therapeutic in a way. As such, I can attribute a late night such as this to writing my last story: Strings

Go ahead and clicky the linky if interested in a medium-length read about the purpose of human life in the seemingly meaningless structure of existence from a predominately social perspective. This story is partially based upon the idea of Existentialism, something that, while working out the plot, I had little to no idea that such a belief or term existed. I wrote what I felt and it just so happened that there are others who've felt the same way and have gone to great lengths to share their thoughts and ideas about the human experience.  An unconsciously-shared experience at times, if you'll allow me such a statement.

The overall belief at the foundation of Existentialism is: while there is no inherent purpose to life that we can perceive or fathom, we are responsible for creating our own meaning and perceiving our own role within the boundaries we define and shape our lives within.

In case you didn't click the link, here's the textbook definition:

"...individuals create the meaning and essence of their lives, as opposed to it being created for them by deities or authorities or defined for them by philosophical or theological doctrines."

Essentially, "Existence precedes essence."

It can then be stated that one is not born a man but becomes a man due to his life experiences and his inward reactions to those given enlightenments of perception. There is no preset to the human product, no deity has chosen your traits for you and placed you within the world as far as you can observe, so everything a man becomes he becomes due to his own will to survive and because of his desire to become something he considers worthy of survival.

Jean-Paul Sartre, the former leading existentialist philosopher, states:

"Man is defined only in so far as he acts and he is responsible for his actions. To clarify, it can be said that a man who acts cruelly towards other people is, by that act, defined as a cruel man and in that same instance, he (as opposed to his genes, for instance) is defined as being responsible for being this cruel man. Of course, the more positive therapeutic aspect of this is also implied: You can choose to act in a different way, and to be a good person instead of a cruel person. Here it is also clear that since man can choose to be either cruel or good, he is, in fact, neither of these things essentially."

So in other words, man has the capacity for both good and evil, pious and impious, therein it is impossible to form a constricting term that will fit him neatly into a classification of only good or only bad. He is neither inherently good nor inherently bad, he simply has the ability, the opportunity, to represent both traits in countless ways during his lifetime. He exists, and that is but the first step in being human; all else results from his intellectual standard and his proceeding actions.

Many early philosophers combatted the idea of "existence before essence", they believed that every human is born with traits that are inert, that are designed to encompass our emotional reactions when the time is right for our minds to do so. Another related philosophical classification is know as Rationalism. Socrates played a major role in the development of this belief, although his most prized student, Plato, eventually formed further beliefs in different studies. And, subsequently, Aristotle, the cherished student of Plato, had little to do with Rationalism as he found the ideas of Empiricism to be more alluring; the idea that all evidence is discovered through experimentation and observation, a strict, scientifically formatted Philosophy.

Existentialism is often considered to be the bleakest and most despairing philosophical movement due to its rather pessimistic nature and its ways of looking at the world from a "realistic" point of view. We all know life isn't perfect, but most would have you never think such a thought in fear of causing harm to your mental faculties and your views of life in general. Many people fear thinking this way due to it causing what has come to be known as "Existential Depression." Essentially, Existential Depression is formed due to anxiety melding with incessant intellectual stimulation in regards to the attempt of fathoming human existence and the possibility of an after-life. Many people facing this dilemma would sooner end their own lives than endure a life of intensely draining questioning. An example would be a young man pondering the idea of eternity. He would first be filled with wonder, and then with insight, then with dread. His level of assurance in human life would undoubtedly lower due to him focusing entirely on something that is completely unknowable. Our minds weren't built to reflect upon things that have never happened, and as such we lack the cognitive ability to look forward into something we've never evolved to comprehend.

Existential Angst/Existential Depression:

"Terms used by existentialists, first attributed to Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). In The Concept of Dread (also known as "The Concept of Anxiety", depending on the translation), Kierkegaard used the word Angest (Danish, meaning "dread") to describe a profound and deep-seated spiritual condition of insecurity and despair in the free human being. Where the animal is a slave to its instincts but always confident in its own actions, Kierkegaard believed that the freedom given to people leaves the human in a constant fear of failing its responsibilities to God. Kierkegaard's concept of angst is considered to be an important stepping stone for 20th-century existentialism. While Kierkegaard's feeling of angst is fear of actual responsibility to God, in modern use, angst was broadened by the later existentialists to include general frustration associated with the conflict between actual responsibilities to self, one's principles, and others (possibly including God).

To ponder the idea of God beyond the point that organized religion insists that we should is likely to result in some feelings of existential dread, if one is intellectually inclined. To the existential freethinking mind the future appears bleak, icy, reasonless; and as such we are to create our meanings to offset our negative emotions and desperation. The same idea applies to Atheism; If one believes that there is nothing after death then why not commit suicide? Some would say they are just here to enjoy the ride, others may offer a deep, justifiable reason. The same is true with Existentialism; the future is only meaningless if we fail to attach meaning to it.

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When I started this entry at 1:45 am, it now being 2:45 am, I had little to write about. Or maybe I should say, "I thought I had little to write about." My eyesight is too blurry to proof-read and make corrections, that will have to wait until tomorrow. So, if you read something that fails to make sense, the likely culprit is sleep deprivation.

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EDIT: 6pm - I would like to add that my inability to sleep and this website's spell-check system is a horrible match. After re-reading this selection today I found spelling errors that a two-year old would pick up on. Now, the only question I have is this: Am I at a lower intelligence level than a two year old or does my lack of sleep impair my ability to write to such a degree that it is almost embarrassing?

Har lige været en tur i Netto - men en anden Netto end den, der i dag blev torpederet - og himlen var grå som bly, og regnen silede ned. Jeg var nødt til at bøje hovedet, mens jeg gik, og på vej hjem fandt jeg først en hundrede-krone-seddel og derefter en meget fin, helt ny og blå skruetrækker-folde-ud-dims.

Er færdig med min biografi om Béla Bartók, som var udmærket, omend ikke særlig inspirerende. Nu overvejer jeg, hvad jeg herefter skal læse ... Mens jeg venter på de bøger, jeg har bestilt via engelske Amazon. Købte forleden en hel pose bøger på Ringsted Bibliotek, som lige nu holder brandudsalg. Masser af gode ting og sager -- heriblandt Nietzsche: "Moralens genealogi", Løgstrups bog om Heidegger, de Sades "Justine", digte af Rilke og flere antologier med amerikansk poesi, Jørgen Nash: "Den flyvende daggert" og meget andet. Samlet pris: Kr. 50,-

Måske vil jeg læse noget Rilke. Eller Trakl. Det er et Trakl-vejr.

Lainaukset Lauri Holländerin gradusta "Traagisesta väkivallasta runolliseen asumiseen, Heidegger ja alkuperäinen kokemus tekniikasta".

Ihminen on Heideggerin mukaan olemukseltaan kaikista oudoin (tulkitessaan Sofokleen Antigone-tragediaa). Ihmisen outous pitää ymmärtää hänen vallitsevuudessa, kun hän on vallankäyttäjä. "Outous liittyy ihmisen tapaan, jolla hän on kaiken keskellä. [...] Luonnon outo ylitsevallitsevuus kanavoituu ihmisen lävitse itseään vastaan; ihmisen vallankäyttö on pyrkimystä selviytyä luonnon ylitsevallitsevuuden ympäröimänä." (s. 39) Ihminen muodostaa vastakohdan kaikelle tavalliselle ja tunnetulle, sillä ihminen on esilläolevan ulkopuolella. Ihmisellä ei ole olemuksellista kotia: ihmisen lävitse vaikuttava tietämys (tekhnê) on väkivaltaista purkautumista muodostaen vastakohdan kotoisalle. Koska hän on kotoisan paljastuneen ulkopuolella, ulkona historiallisesta paikasta (jossa hän rakentaa, asuu ja käyttää kieltä), ihminen on ainoa oleva paljastamaan uusia polkuja. "Äärimmäinen väkivallankäyttäjä toimii porttina, jossa oleva murtautuu avoimeen." (s. 42)

Kaikkea vallankäyttöä artikuloi se, että vallankäyttö pyrkii vastaamaan ylitsevallitsevuutta vastaan. Vallankäyttö ei ole kuitenkaan peräisin ihmisestä itsestään: ihminen toimii vain eräänlaisena välikappaleena, voimien siirtovälineenä, jotka mahdollistavat olevan astuvan avoimeen. Tämä mahdollistaa esiintulemisen synnyttäen paikan, johon oleva tulee läsnäolevaksi. "Ihminen antaa merelle paikan, jonka ympärille aaltojen raivo voi rakentua" (s. 43, kursivointi Holländerin). Tässä ihminen löytää itsensä. Liikkuessaan ihmisen kautta kulkeneet voimat asettavat olevan avoimeen "merenä maana ja eläiminä". Oleva paljastuu aina jonakin, sillä se saa rajansa ihmisen toiminnalla.

Väkivallan käsite Heideggerin filosofiaan on usein ollut pahennuksen kohteena - juuri hänen natsisympatioidensa takia. Holländer osoittaa kuitenkin gradussaan, että Heideggerin filosofiassa esiintyvää väkivallankäyttöä ei tarvitse tulkita normatiivisesti: "Heidegger ei ihannoi ihmisen tai tekniikan väkivaltaisuutta; hänen tulkintansa ei myöskään liiku ontisella tasolla ja kuvaa ihmisen praktista toimintaa tai sen mahdollista väkivaltaisuutta. On kyse ihmisen ja olemisen ontologisesti ainutlaatuisesta suhteesta, joka pohjautuu jatkuvaan konfliktiin ja ihmiseen alituiseen kodittomuuteen." (s. 66) Kyse väkivallasta Heideggerille koskettaa lähinnä ihmisen käsityskyvyssä vaikuttavien voimien "yhteenotosta olemisen kanssa".

und jetzt erreicht mich folgender kommentar aus den staaten, von genau jener person, die wir alle z.z. gern sein würden: eine, die dort lebt und wählen darf. WÄHLEN! und, was ist deren schluss?

...Obama (apropos Hoffnung) entpuppt sich als schlimmerer Sülzredner als es die Lieder von Roy Black je waren (bitte frag nicht, wo diese Assoziation jetzt herkommt, rudimentäre Restbestände meiner deutschen Kultur...)...

ich zeige mich geschockt von soviel schwärze in den gedanken! ist dieser rassismus noch tragbar? wohin schliddert das deutsche kulturgut? ist das rassismus roy black gegenüber? warum wird nicht auf howard carpendale herumgehackt?

und - für mich die frage: ist das da-sein wirklich dem in-der-welt-sein vozuziehen?
(ich füge im geiste ein kapitel ein, eine unterhaltung mit heidi egger über rassismus, musik und farbenlehre (aka auch adorno und goethe))

und wenn obama roy black ist, wer ist john mccain? wer hillary clinton? und was ist mit gitti & erika? ratlos.

Aquí está el punto de enlace para la interpretación lingüístico-analítica. Habrá que preguntar continuamente si lo que Heidegger evoca puede ser traducido a una comunicación controlable (Autoconsciencia y autodeterminación).

Heidegger traduzido para o espanhol:

La esencia de lo dis-puesto [Gestell] es el poner [stellen] en sí reunido, que, con el olvido, pospone [nachstellt] su propria verdade esencial, el cual posponer se descompone [verstellt] mediante su desplegarse en el establecer [Bestellen = poner a disposición] a todo lo presente como componente [Bestand], se erige en éste y en cuanto tal rige (La vuelta, Die Kehre).

Heidegger traduzido para o inglês:

The enowning of en-ownment gathers within itself the de-cision (Ent-scheidung): that freedom, as the ground that holds to abground, lets a distress emerge from out of which, as from out of the overflow of the ground, gods and man come forth into partedness (Contributions to philosophy: from enowning).

Heidegger traduzido para o português:

A liberdade rege o aberto, no sentido do aclarado, isto é, do des-encoberto. A liberdade tem seu parentesco mais próximo e mais íntimo com o dar-se do desencobrimento, ou seja, da verdade. Todo desencobrimento pertence a um abrigar e esconder. Ora, o que liberta é o mistério, um encoberto que sempre se encobre, mesmo quando se desencobre. Todo desencobrimento provém do que é livre, dirige-se ao que é livre e conduz ao que é livre. A liberdade do livre não está na licença do arbitrário nem na submissão a simples leis. A liberdade é o que aclarando encobre e cobre, em cuja clareira tremula o véu que vela o vigor de toda verdade e faz aparecer o véu como o véu que vela (A questão da técnica).

Tugendhat definitivamente não estará na minha estante de livros esta semana...

La métamorphose de la chenille en papillon nous offre une métaphore intéressante : quand la chenille entre dans le cocon, elle commence un processus d'autodestruction de son organisme de chenille, et ce processus est en même temps celui de formation de l'organisme du papillon, lequel est à la fois le même et un autre que la chenille. Cela est la métamorphose. La métamorphose du papillon est préorganisée. La métamorphose des sociétés humaines en une société monde est aléatoire, incertaine, et elle est tributaire des dangers du chaos qui lui sont pourtant nécessaires.

S'il est vrai que, de même que notre organisme porte en lui des cellules souches indifférenciées capables, comme les cellules embryonnaires, de créer tous les divers organismes de notre être, de même l'humanité possède en elle les vertus génériques qui permettent des créations nouvelles ; s'il est vrai que ces vertus sont endormies, inhibées sous les spécialisations et rigidités de notre société, alors les crises généralisées qui les secouent et secouent la planète pourraient permettre la métamorphose devenue vitale.

C'est pourquoi nous ne devons plus continuer sur la route du "développement". il nous faut changer de voie, il nous faut un nouveau commencement. La phrase de Heidegger doit raisonner comme un appel : "L'origine n'est pas derrière nous, elle est devant nous."

Stella Florence (http://itodas.uol.com.br/)

Heráclito também disse quase a mesma coisa: "A verdadeira constituição das coisas gosta de ocultar-se." Quando ele diz a verdadeira constituição refere-se ao Ser, tal qual feito por Heidegger, quando afirma: "(...) a analítica existencial do Dasein mobiliza igualmente uma tarefa, cuja urgência não é menor que a questão do ser, a saber, a liberação do a priori, que se deve fazer visível, a fim de possibilitar a discussão filosófica da questão 'o que é o homem."

Værdi er en rettesnor hen mod noget absolut. Af absolutte absolutter kan jeg ikke nævne én eneste. Alle mine værdier er relative. Hver og en.

Det er min overbevisning, at sådan forholder det sig med alle værdier.

Det er nok derfor, jeg ikke kan lide Koranen. Men jeg tillægger den alligevel STOR værdi. Politisk betragtet den største i og med, den ideologi, der er beskrevet i den lortebog er et nok så væsentligt udgangspunkt for den såkaldte værdidebat...

"Alle mine værdier er relative" og derfra går hun over til at sige, at "Det er min overbevisning, at sådan forholder det sig med alle værdier." Udgangspunktet er altså et partikulært, absolut udsagn (mine værdier er relative), hvorfra der kobles til et almenniveau (alle værdier er relative), der bygger på en formening, hvorfra der sluttes til en almen, absolut dom (Koranen er en lortebog). Dronningen går altså fra et relativt personligt synspunkt til en absolut almen dom.

For lidt over tre år siden lød det anderledes fra Dronningen:

Jeg er klar over, at visse religiøse mennesker/grupper bruger religion til at årsagsforklare eksistentielle forhold - men at det skulle retfærdiggøre andres ret til at kalde dem for klaphatte eller lignende [f.eks. Koranen er en lortebog?], det peger da vist mere på bedrevidenhed og intolerance end et egentligt sagsforhold.

En religiøs tankegang udelukker på ingen måde en fornuftsbetonet tankegang. Disse kan sagtens eksistere som komplimentere størrelser. Se på de faktiske sagsforhold og overvej om religionen i disse menneskers liv måske fungerer som mediator for håb, social konstruktion (?) og trøst fremfor iboende mulighed til at slå fornuften fra.

Kunne Koranen på lignende vis ikke også for bare én enkelt muslim "fungerer som mediator for håb, social konstruktion (?) og trøst fremfor iboende mulighed til at slå fornuften fra"? Og kan den det, så er den vel ikke nødvendigvis en lortebog? Kan man ikke også med nogenlunde retfærdighed sige, at det ikke er Koranen, der slår ihjel, men derimod nogle enkeltindivider?

Men hvis Koranen er en lortebog, har vi i hvert fald et absolut i Dronningens univers, der kan den så stå sammen med Heidegger (eller er det bare §§ 31-32?), der synes at indtage et universalmiddel mod al verdens dårligdom. Det sørgelige er, at Eksistens efterhånden er blevet udvandet til nogle enkelte løsninger spædet op med en yderst manipulativ retorik og en fuldstændig mangel på forståelse for visse andre perspektiver (gerne dem, der yder en reel modstand).

Kan man tale om det skrøbeligt absolutte ovre på eksistensen? Nå, jeg hæfter mig bare ved, at Dronningen 15. juli ovre på Oplysningskritik skrev følgende:

en (universitetsuddannet) kommentator skrev på et tidspunkt på min blog "Jeg tror ikke på provokationens aprioriske værdi"

At skrive sådan er helt ude i hampen og et voksens (well...) eksempel på dit udgangspunkt, alt er relativisme. JEG tror ikke på, ergo virker det ikke, og det har jeg RET til at mene.

Men i dag er det langt fra ude i hampen at tale om overbevisning (og tidligere om tro), men sådan er der forskel på folk; "det peger da vist mere på bedrevidenhed og intolerance end et egentligt sagsforhold."

Min pointe er, at det Dronningen kritiserer andre for, gør hun selv med største selvfølgelighed og uden at kunne/ville drage en parallel mellem de to udgangspunkter (dvs. mellem kritikken og egne indlæg). Dermed mener jeg også, at den uredelighed, hun i hvert fald tidligere gjorde sig til talsmand imod, ligger hun selv under for.

Hope these help!

WALKTHROUGHS, GAMES REVIEWS, CHEAT CODES, NEWS

Leave a note to the author of the walkthroughs if you find any particular one useful. It's a simple way to say thanks.

• GameFaqs (my personal favourite)
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OFFICIAL WEBSITES

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WALLPAPER GALLERY

All these wallpapers were originally posted on Square's Official website (92 pcs in total); and some are fan-arts modified from the official ones, taken from one of the 6 listed above.  Please click on the pic below to be taken to the gallery coz for some reason I can't insert the gallery in this post:

]]> http://qualquest.wordpress.com/?p=108 Fri, 22 Aug 2008 17:15:58 +0000 krlacey http://qualquest.wordpress.com/?p=108 Bernard Stiegler
Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus
Area: Rhetorical and Critical Theory
Notes from class:
•    Arranging human and machinic
•    Not humanization of nature, but naturalization of the human
•    Humans are more natural through technology
o    Control societies
•    Biopower is operating system of capitalism
o    Spontaneity is not problem for system
•    Beller: not just watching
o    “selling” product
•    Something is provided for all so none will escape
o    Adorno and Horkheimer
•    Nealon: Because everyone must provide something, no one will escape
•    All subjectivity is up for grabs: everyone must be someone
•    Demographic DNA
o    Broad version of the social
o    Giant picture from Heidegger
•    Useful finality
•    Virno: virtuosity—no end product
o    Goodness is not enough
•    Steigler’s response to no future
o    Cybernetics
•    Before with technology: death
o    Now, technology leads to life
•    Blanchot: wiped out
•    What one does with life
o    The impact to cause life
o    Change
•    Leroi-Gourhan/Steigler: Posthuman as a concept
o    Machinic heterogenetic: Guatarri
o    Bodies without organs
•    Desires for the fake
o    John Lovelock: guya theory
•    Benjamin: inorganic
•    Love of articifiality
•    Paradise of the artificial
o    Hatred of natural
•    Episteme v. techne
•    What’s the who, what’s the what
o    Actors of history
•    Anthropology: feet, hands, face
•    Technogenesis: mobility, change
•    Promethesis/Meno: no origin, no future
•    Contra Heidegger: Only a god can save us no
o    Techne or time
o    No going back
•    Q: What takes the place of philosophy now? A: Cybernetics
Critical moments in the text
2: “Lodged between [mechanics and biology], technical beings are nothing but a hybrid, enjoying no more ontological status than they did in ancient philosophy.”
6: “[Dasien]’s death is what it cannot know, and to this extent, death gives to ‘mine-ness’ its excess.  Death is not an event within existence because it is the very possibility of existence, a possibility that is at the same time essentially and interminably deferred.  This originary deferral is also what gives Dasein its difference to another.”
23: “Today, machines are the tool bearers, and the human is no longer a technical individual; the human becomes either the machine’s servant or its assembler.”
50: “The problem arising here is that the evolution of this essentially technical being that the human is exceeds the biological, although this dimension is an essential part of the technical phenomenon itself, something like its enigma.  The evolution of the ‘prosthesis,’ not itself living, by which the human is nonetheless defined as a living being, constitutes the reality of the human’s evolution, as if, with it, the history of life were to continue by means other than life: this is the paradox of a living being characterized in its forms of life by the nonliving—or by the traces that its life leaves in the nonliving.”
66: “To know the essence of the machine, and thereby understanding the sense of technics in general, is also to know the place of the human in technical ensembles.”
70: external memory
95: “If technics can be given its own finality, this means that its thinking in terms of ends and means is no longer sufficiently radical.”
114: “Denaturalization will be self-exteriorization, the becoming self-dependent, self-alienation, the alienation of the originary, the authentic, in the factical, the technical, the artificial death constitutive of the mediacy of a social and differentiated world of objects, and hence of subjects, for, from this points on, it is only though its objects, (the objects it has) that the self can define and thus is no longer itself.”
131: “Love is an interested and particular passion, which risks bringing ‘destruction to the human race,’ making possible the opposite of that for which if seems to exist: ‘a terrible passion that braves danger, surmounts all obstacles, and in its transports seems calculated to bring destruction on the human race which it is really destined to preserve.”
Think: Derrida Gift of Death; Edelman: No Future
148: “With the advent of exteriorization, the body of the living individual is no longer only a body: it can only function with its tools.”
177: “The individual develops three memories: genetic memory; memory of the central nervous system (epigenetic); and techno-logical memory (language and technics are here amalgamated in the process of exteriorization)
202: “Promethia is the anticipation of the future, that is, of danger, foresight, prudence, and an essential disquiet: somebody who is promethes is someone who is worried in advance.”
207: “’In its factial being, any Dasein is as it walready was, and it is ‘what’ is already was.  It is its past, whether explicitly or not.”
(Re-read: Disengagement of the What→memory)

Wordpress as a per cent

Browsing around Wordpress it seems blogs fall into some pretty generic categories. If you selected 10 blogs at random 5 of them would be expressly about religion. I don't have anything to say to people who let religion consume their lives, so that's not of much interest to me. 2 of those 10 blogs are in foreign languages. Again not much use. 1 will be by someone who is genuinely crazy, just sporadically and chaotically spamming words onto the page. If you imagine this breakdown as a pie chart, the remaining 20% includes a huge amount of diversity. Some business. Some photography collections. Some people keeping a diary. I try to leave a comment on the coherent ones.

Internet and Community

People often say that the internet brings niche groups together. If you had a tiny minority interest prior to the internet you'd never find someone with the same interest. Even if you walked past such a person in the street, it wasn't practical to walk around saying "I'm a furry" to everyone you see. You'd be ridiculed. The internet, however, allows you to get on a soap-box and scream it to the world. This is pretty brilliant if you're a furry.

This idea of community forming is pretty much why I'm online. I'm searching for people who broadly share the same world view as me. Problem is that it's much harder than it seems. Furries are in business because there is some obvious label that unities them. They can unite behind the banner and their community can form. Furries might have diverse political or religious beliefs, but they can be communal around their Furryness. Religious people, as Wordpress proves, also are in business. Being religious speaks to a lot more than your articles of faith. Religious commonality also conjoins with similar social views, similar politics, similar morals and all other kinds of things. Religion is an organised pigeon hole.

None of this is working for me. The acknowledged problem with this blog is that I don't have a clearly defined topic. I want to talk about whatever tickles my world view at the moment. I don't really want to blog if I'm not free to do that. I can't unite behind a single-issue banner like being a furry (note: I'm not a furry).

I also don't fall into one of these pigeon holes. I suppose the best pigeon holes would be 'atheist' or 'law student'. I identify with these concepts on a sort of deep level. But they're not categories with homogeneous values.

Solutions?

Two options:

1) I keep pressing the 'next' button and hope.

2) I try and divide my world-view up into the 10 (or so) different issues I identify with on a deeper level and then try and find or build matching communities.

Any ideas?