My favorite argument against the LHC is the one which takes the form: "According to Hawking's theory of the universe, black holes will burn off Hawking radiation... but Hawking's theories are disputed."  Of course, as I understand it, you have to agree with Hawking's theories about the universe to expect mini black holes MIGHT be created in the first place.  I don't know much about cosmology, but I do think it seems like an unreasonable premise to be worried about a theoretical risk because you do not trust the cosmological understanding that generates the risk in the first place--I don't think that you can sort of grocery shop what you do and don't think quantum physics implies the way that critics are doing... maybe I'm wrong.

Mostly, I am thinking about Hume and inductive reasoning. The LHC seems to me to be a revelatory moment that we link our actions to expected outcomes with a strength much closer to habit than reason as to be a little upsetting.  Why do I think typing on my keyboard won't destroy the universe?  It's not because I can mentally rule out all possible catastrophic chains of events coming from writing this as much as because I do it all the time, and in fact, lots of people do it all the time and it seems to be a pretty safe physical collision almost every time (save carpal-tunnel syndrome and writing inflamatory messages).  I am not initially scared of a super-collider because I know that it will be dangerous. I am initially scared because I do not know what it does.  Even in acquiring enough information to believe that it is safe for the best possible reasons, and knowing that there is an inductive pattern of the same objections against smaller colliders that have all not destroyed earth, knowing that it might work does not provide the same comfort as experience. In that way, it is a great bogeyman of doomsday proclamation to threaten all future experience with destruction from an experiment that could not be more alien to me. Once I am honset about that, it becomes easier to come back to reason to restore my faith in it as how to make public decisions.

Kant Fundamento da Metafísica dos costumes, Crítica da Razão Prática

Tocqueville Da Democracia na América

Marx Manifesto do Partido Comunista, Manuscritos de 1844, Antologia do Capital

Hegel A Introdução à História da Filosofia, O Sistema da Vida Ética

Schopenhauer Mundo com Vontade de Representação

Nietzsche Assim Falava Zaratustra, Crepúsculo dos Ídolos, Ecce Homo

Husserl Meditações Cartesianas

Bergson As Duas Fontes da Moral e da Religião, A Evolução Criadora

• Os que já saíram e que, também, são de elevado valor:

Platão O Banquete, Fedro, Apologia de Sócrates

Aristóteles Política

Séneca (Os Estóicos), A Vida Feliz, Manual (Epicteto), Pensamentos (Marco Aurélio) (meu favorito)

Santo Agostinho Confissões

Maquiavel O Príncipe, A Arte da Guerra

Descartes Discurso do Método, Meditações Metafísicas

Pascal Pensamentos

Kierkegaard O Desespero Humano

Locke Dois Tratados do Governo Civil, Carta e Ensaio sobre a Tolerância

Leibniz Discurso da Metafísica, Monadologia

Voltaire Cândido ou o Optimismo, Tratado sobre a Tolerância

Hume Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural

Confesso, que estava à espera de Sartre e de Rousseau. Fica para próxima. :)

Articles:
An interesting paper (PDF) on the human brain's reaction to art, and how the brain has possibly evolved with the help of art.
A short 1997 article introducing a study of art that visually describes quantum physics.
Robin Yeary, "The Art of Science," IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications, 17(2),  pp. 4-5,  March-April,  1997. (I can't get a link because I'm not an IEEE member, but I'm sure it's awesome).
And of course there is always the SPIE Journal of Electronic Imaging.

Books:
The Art of Science, By Boris Castel, Sergio Sismondo – looks at scientists and the doing of science
The Art of Science: Activities and Creative Ideas for the Teaching of Science to Children 5 to 9, by Barbara Hume and Christine Galton (pretty self-explanatory).
Pythagoras' Trousers: God, Physics, and the Gender Wars, By Margaret Wertheim.
More a book about culture and science, but worth perusing. And NO, it's not a man-bashing book. It's really about Physics.

L'AVVENTURA DI MISTER HUME

Non sappiamo come e quando, né a quale prezzo, ma è certo che David Hume entrò un giorno in possesso del cannocchiale di Calileo.
Rimirò a lungo il prodigioso strumento, ma, trovando insulso lo spettacolo delle distanze cosmiche - a che pro affaticarsi attorno a stupide palle di fuoco? - decise di puntarlo su di sé, per sondare gli inesplorati recessi della natura umana.
A tutta prima lo spettacolo inusitato lo stupi grandemente: vide le squame minute sul palmo delle sue mani, geometricamente disposte come tessere di un mosaico, vide il pallore del suo ventre sollevarsi come una duna nel deserto mentre una sconosciuta vertigine si apriva nell'umido cratere dell'ombelico. Poi volle scrutare gli anfratti della mente per disegnare una mappa del corso dei suoi pensieri. Molte cose contemplò: la traccia dei cammini, il luogo degli incontri, i sottili urti delle immagini e gli impercettibili interstizi per cui si avvicendano e si incastrano, quasi calamitandosi. E avendo percorso in lungo e in largo paesaggio e sentieri senza trovare traccia del viandante, pensò di abbandonare la sua ricerca sulla natura umana, giudicando il suo oggetto inesistente.
Poi però, fulminato da un lampo d'arguzia tutta scozzese, decise di scrivere un dettagliato resoconto di quella strana indagine, per lasciare ai posteri un enigma sibillino da risolvere: è possibile che il risultato più sublime della Scienza sia proprio l'estinzione dello Scienziato?
Qualcuno, da Konigsberg, avrebbe raccolto la sfida.

IL TEMPO DEGLI OCCHIALI

Quel benedetto cannocchiale giunse alfine tra le mani del professor Kant. L'orologio di Konigsberg pensò per una volta di fare l'orologiaio, e così smontò lo strumento. Vi trovò due lenti rotonde. E disse: «Ogni cosa appare tonda perché le lenti sono tonde. Le lenti sono tonde perché l'occhio è rotondo. E se vi fosse da qualche parte un occhio quadrato?» Questo pensiero dapprima lo rese alquanto inquieto.
Poi si riprese, anzi gli venne un 'idea rivoluzionaria, quasi copernicana. Disse: «L'unico modo per non dubitare delle lenti è quello di non toglierle mai». Così armeggiò per un quarto d'ora finché ne ebbe fatto un paio d'occhiali, che inforcò soddisfatto sul naso.
Veramente avvertì durante l'operazione qualcosa come un sottile disagio, un piccolo pensiero, solo un insetto fastidioso, sia chiaro - perché gli venne in mente che per costruire gli occhiali stava lavorando senza lenti. Ma l'opera era ormai terminata e adesso il mondo ridondava lucente e perfetto come la sfera di Parmenide, senza più fessure.
« Scienza e scienziato sono una cosa», disse.
E si affrettò ad uscire: era tempo per la passeggiata, e i bravi cittadini di Konigsberg erano impazienti di regolare gli orologi.

Hume famously said that he noticed something very peculiar in the arguments of those making moral arguments. They would always conducted this curious kind shift, from "is" statements to "ought" statements. This is how he put it:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not,that expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

- A Treatise of Human Nature

At first this seems quite formidable, for there does seem some kind of slippage. Suddenly one kind of thing seems to be talked about, and then another. And the assumption here is that these are really two kind of mutually exclusive things, that one really can't go from one to the other. That is, one is really reefed on the one side of "is", getting a glimpse of the sandbar of "ought" but just can't agumentatively swim the distance.

But to change the metaphor (always exciting to mix metaphors, it makes the world turn), this apparent insolution is based a bit on a fork in the road, the so-called "Hume' Fork". He puts it this way:

All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic ... [which are] discoverable by the mere operation of thought ... Matters of fact, which are the second object of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing.  

- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Moral "oughts" just don't have place in this dichotomy of "objects". There are, by his assertion, no "moral objects". One can see floating behind such a fork the Analytic truths distiction which Quine worked to undo. The question is, if this strict and categorical distinction is not maintained, can the from is-to-ought (and from ought-to-is ) prohibition be maintained? Is there really such a fork in the road? As a side note, Wittgenstein went far in this direction turning "Relation of Ideas" into the "grammar" of words but also relatedly, the realm of criteria referring reasons, but was this When one starts treating the grammatical or criteria as if one is treating "facts", Wittgenstein wants us to see that one approaches a kind of non-sense. But I would like to keep my eye upon the is-ought distintion.

I would say that what one has to understand is that this difference between "is" and "ought" is not a matter of deduction, that is, one can differentiate claims into kinds, but not make them mutually exclusive. That is, again, knowledge is not something that we "get" from an environmental "is" which then we do stuff to (empiricism). No sense data enters into our brains, which then gets mashed up into different forms by ideas and concepts, which eventually gets transformed (appropriately, or inappropriately) into "oughts". If this were the case, this would be a empirical picture of the world, and in such a picture one can get the sense that is and ought do not coincide. But because the analytic (saying something about ideas alone) and emprical (saying something about the world) distinct does not strictly hold (beliefs and criteria must always be included in statements of fact about the world), the normative cannot be categorical excluded from any "is". Further any "is" statement, pulls along with it a communitarian inforcement quite related to "ought".

To show this conceptual inter-relationship: "That is a 'cat'." (A simple ostensive defintion), is certainly differentiatable from "You ought to call that a 'cat'". But the second form is wrapped up in the first. I certainly can tell the differences between them, but I can also see that the two are intimately related. Now, there is a very long way from "You ought to call that a 'cat'" to "You ought not to murder", but the essential, thought to be unbreakable transition is already there. Prescription lies at the heart of description.

As one employs these ostensive, and otherwise established criteria, to describe the world, the normativity of use is subsumed in the process.

To argue the length of it, from the one (of use) to the other (of murer) is a, perhaps worthy, but lengthy task. One that I would not really engage in this particular form, under this particular question. If one wants to get a taste of it, one can visit Spinoza's Ethics. One can, as I have done, put his "imitation of the affects" principle which governs sociability and conflict,

If we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.

Spinoza, E3, Proposition 27:

in close relation to Davidson Principle of Charity and Triangulation (more on this in essay "Wasps, Orchids, Beetles and Crickets: A Menagerie of Change in Transgender Identification"). If one does, I believe they will see that because the Principle of Charity is not a wise adage, but a componented part of all interpretability and sense making, any description presumes a prescriptive. Any communicability of what "is" draws in with it the normatives of community, which enable it. The Deontic is a folded into the Ontic, so to speak. First at the level of performative force, secondly at the level of affective binding. The mistake is, of course, to think that any ONE prescriptive has deontological standing, which cannot be violated (this was Kant's mistake of universal law-making). Just like beliefs where any particular belief can be false, but all beliefs cannot be false, any one rule can be broken, but not ALL rules can be broken, and one still remain a describer of the world.

P.S.: Adoro o espelho.

A Lista completa dos filósofos e respectivas obras:

18 Abril - Platão O Banquete, Fedra, Apologia de Sócrates

25 Abril - Aristóteles Política

2 Maio - Séneca (Os Estóicos) A Vida Feliz, Manual (Epicteto), Pensamentos (Marco Aurélio)

9 Maio - Santo Agostinho Confissões

16 Maio - Maquiavel O Príncipe, A Arte da Guerra

23 Maio - Descartes Discurso do Método, Meditações Metafísicas

30 Maio - Pascal Pensamentos

6 Junho - Kierkegaard O Desespero Humano

13 Junho - Locke Dois Tratados do Governo Civil, Carta e Ensaio sobre a Tolerância

20 Junho - Leibniz Discurso da Metafísica, Monadologia

27 Junho - Voltaire Cândido ou o Optimismo, Tratado sobre a Tolerância

4 Julho - Hume Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural

11 Julho - Kant Fundamento da Metafísica dos costumes, Crítica da Razão Prática

18 Julho - Tocqueville Da Democracia na América

25 Julho - Marx Manifesto do Partido Comunista, Manuscritos de 1844, Antologia do Capital

1 Agosto - Hegel A Introdução à História da Filosofia, O Sistema da Vida Ética

8 Agosto - Schopenhauer Mundo com Vontade de Representação

15 Agosto - Nietzsche Assim Falava Zaratustra, Crepúsculo dos Ídolos, Ecce Homo

22 Agosto - Husserl Meditações Cartesianas

29 Agosto - Bergson As Duas Fontes da Moral e da Religião, A Evolução Criadora

To believe something, you have to act in a way that is consistent with the belief being true. Otherwise, you're just saying that you believe it. If someone tells you that twiglets are highly toxic and will kill you instantly, at the same time as munching a bag full of them, you're likely to doubt they really believe it. Same thing if they told you that it would lead you to an eternity of damnation. You wouldn't trade in the brief pleasure of eating a bag of twiglets for an eternity of damnation if you really believed in it. But this is exactly the situation of people claiming to believe in God whilst simultaneously doing things all the time that are inconsistent with it being true. Anyone who believes in hell but sins anyway - they don't really believe in hell. Someone who believes in the teaching of Jesus, but also thinks that capitalism is a great idea - doesn't really believe in Jesus' teachings at all. And so on.

Now at this point, a Catholic will come along and say: you don't necessarily go to hell if you sin, as long as you repent afterwards. But... if you sin planning to 'repent' afterwards, that doesn't count (so I'm told). Well, I bet quite a lot of that goes on if people were honest with themselves. It seems to me that if you really believed in God, you wouldn't try to sneak stuff by on a technicality. If you have any respect for the concept at all, you've surely gotta believe that He is wise to that.

In fact, when a religious rule is inconvenient, it tends to be ignored, or the meaning of it changed. In a capitalist society, the stuff that is antithetical to the pursuit of wealth is ignored. In a liberal society, the stuff about stoning adulterers and homosexuals is ignored. Conversely, in an illiberal one the stuff about loving your neighbour and turning the other cheek is ignored.

When it comes to a clash between what religion says you should do, and what is convenient to do in real life, convenience wins out over religion almost every time. Or in other words, the reason that there are so many adulterous affairs is that people don't give any credence to the idea that they will be eternally punished for it in the afterlife (no shag is good enough to warrant infinite and everlasting pain as a consequence, surely?). In practice they behave, quite sensibly, as if the notions of religion were false. And for these reasons, I think it's fair to say that most people don't believe in God.

The meaning of 'belief'

I suppose to make my case a bit more convincing I need to say something about the meaning of the word 'belief'. Three obvious possibilities come to my mind when trying to define what belief might mean, someone believes something if:

1. They say they believe it.
2. They act in a way that is consistent with it being true.
3. They are in some internal state correlative with the concept 'belief'.

The twiglet example shows that (1) isn't good enough, and it's not clear that (3) has any meaning although it's obviously compelling in some way. So for me, I have to go with (2), although I'd modify it slightly. I would say that to believe something is, roughly speaking, to act in accordance with a mental model of the world in which the proposition is true. I prefer this way of talking about it because it deals with the difficulty of defining what is or isn't true (you can define truth or falsity of a proposition relative to a model without having to define it for the real world), and it gives a slightly more precise idea of what sorts of actions would count as consistent (i.e. those that are made by some decision-making procedure based on a mental model relative to which the proposition is true). This definition has its difficult points too, but I think it's a helpful starting point at least.

In my experience of explaining this idea to people, there are various sticking points that stop people from agreeing that nobody believes in God. For starters, it seems kind of rude to suggest all these people are saying they believe in God but don't really. Well, maybe that is rude, but is it any ruder than saying that one of their fundamental beliefs is wrong and that their view of the world is completely warped? I don't think so, but even if it is that's no reason not to say it. I think a more fundamental sticking point is that most people tend to have some sort of mixture of definitions (1) and (3) in their minds when asked about what belief means. If there is a mental state correlative to 'belief' - and introspection and intuition says there is - then surely the best person to report the status of that mental state is the person concerned. All very democratic, but people are often very bad at introspection and may themselves think that the fact that they are saying something without attempting to deceive means they believe it. The problem with that is: what about the unconscious?

The last sticking point is perhaps the most interesting of all, that in many ways it seems as though people do act in a way that is consistent with it being true. They go to church (some of them), they try to avoid sinning too much, they pray, etc. My response to this is that all of these actions are consequences of their believing that they believe, but not their actual believing. And I think that's not a contradiction. The thing is, our mental models are disjointed fragmentary ones, not grand theories of everything. To get by in the world, we only need incomplete, heuristic models of situations that tend to recur. A mental model of the world in which we act as if we had a mental model of the world in which God exists doesn't necessarily mean that we do indeed have a mental model of the world in which God exists. Mental models, and decision making procedures based on them, don't have to be complete or accurate. They don't need to be deductively complete or consistent, because most of the time we're not capable of nor interested in making all the deductive conclusions possible from our different fragmentary mental models. In particular, our mental models of ourselves are often quite incredibly wrong. We think "In situation X I would do Y", but then situation X happens and we do Z, the exact opposite of Y. It happens all the time. So it's perfectly possible that we can believe that we believe in God, and consequently do all of the things we associate with a person who believes in God, but not actually believe in God (which would if we thought about it deeply enough, entail doing all sorts of things we wouldn't actually do).

Dennett

With most ideas, someone has already had them before you (often Hume in my experience, the clever bugger), and this is no exception. I haven't read much Dennett, but it appears he has covered some of the same ground. I'm told that he makes a distinction between belief and opinion that is somewhat akin to what I'm talking about here. I didn't find anything directly about this (please post a link in the comments if you have a good one), but his article Do Animals Have Beliefs? has this interesting nugget which might have some relevance to the discussion of the three definitions of belief above:

There are independent, salient states which belief-talk 'measures' to a first approximation.

I also found this YouTube video of him saying that he doesn't believe that believers really believe. It's my first embedded video on this blog, too.

Livro: Ensaios Morais, Políticos e Literários, Hume (Coleção Os Pensadores, edição de 1999)
Frase: "Ainda não avancei muito por entre as sombras do espesso bosque, que em minha volta espalham uma dupla noite, quando quase logo, creio, avisto através da penumbra a deslumbrante Célia, a amada de meus desejos, que vagueia com impaciência pelo bosque e, adiantando-se à hora prevista, silenciosamente censura meus passos tardios."

Tio Hume escrevia bem pra caramba! =P De todos os filósofos, Hume (até mais que Kant) com certeza é um dos que mais escreve com tanta maestria e clareza. Aos pensadores de plantão e/ou aos que ainda não tiveram contato com a filosofia de Hume... Fica aí a minha dica: conheçam as obras deste cara!

Carinhosamente, a colega Sagesse, me passou este meme-corrente, agora repasso-o para as amigas Jazz e Lari Guerra. ;)

Beijocas e boa semana para todos os amiguinhos blogueiros!

How can we percieve causative relationships? A causative relationship, of course, is that little matter that we call "cause and effect". And a causative relationship is the rule that we humans so often make, when we are presented with two objects in rapid succession, over countless times, that the first object causes the second.

For example, If I see a bowling ball in somebodies hand, and upon seeing the hand let go of the bowling ball, proceed to see the bowling ball fall to the floor, I might come to expect that the opening of the hand causes the falling of the ball. It is a cause and effect relationship, a rule that has been burned in our minds.

But therein lies a probably, presented neatly by Hume: In our knowledge of the world, we may percieve impressions, of which we form ideas, and that these impressions and ideas, total consist of the entire sum of knowledge that we may hold in our minds. In other words, when we think of anything, imagination or memory, we are always recalling upon the store of impressions felt and ideas drawn from those impressions, all of which have only come from direct experience. Complex imaginations, such as unicorns can always be broken down into elementary impressions and ideas formed from experience. As an example, we may never have seen a unicorn, but we have certainly seen horns, and we have certainly seen white horses.

The problem I spoke of, however, comes when we apply this theory of knowledge to the knowledge of causative relationships, namely "cause and effect". And to show this, I shall ask a question: Upon inspecting an object A, is there anything about object A, any quality or observation, that shall lead us to deduce that object B will follow soon after? Nope. The only thing we can observe about any object is relational to that object itself, that object only.

Thus, the only reason we come to conclude that A "causes" B is the fact that whenever we see A we almost immediately see B. In other words, the law of causation comes from sequence only. Sequence. Succession. If that is the case however, then it is obvious that causative relationships can not form any part of an independent existence in human knowledge. And it's true. Have you ever had an "impression" of a causative relationship? Have you ever seen one? No. You've only infered in from repeated sequence, but you can never inspect one.

This was one of the tricky conundrums of the 19th centure, and represented a dead-end: the end result of lockian influence come out to a harrowing negative. Since then, modern philosophy has become quite sceptical, and for good reason. After all, while direct cause and effect laws never show up in developed sciences, the law of "cause and effect" is one of the foundations for believing the validity of western science. The fact that cause and effect is not part of human knowledge means that there is no valid reason to expect that the same effect shall come of the same cause at all. You can not infer the relationship by inspecting either object, and thus can not come to believe in any causative relationship. Bring this principle to it's fullest conclusion, and the whole of modern science is a sham.

I think, however, that hume did not go deep enough. Far from this representing a dead end, I feel that there is more to be discovered in order to resolve the current discrepancy. And the way to begin the investigation behind the scenes, as always, is to examine the assumptions of the argument.

What does Hume assume when he says, "if you examine object A or object B, you can find nothing that demonstratably links the two objects in a causal relationship."? The answer, of course, is that A and B are separate entities. When we realize this, a sudden new pathway opens up, and the deep thinker realizes that Hume might not be such a dead end after all. Let's go back to the bowling ball example: The first object, or impression of an object, is that of the hand holding the bowling ball. The second object, or impression of a sescond object, is that of the ball lying in a dent on the floor.

But these two impressions are hardly the same; a ball being held by a hand is not equivalent to a ball laying on the floor. A does not eqal B. But: When the object of ones attention is B, can we also say that the object A still exists? No. and that's the key. Effects destroy their causes, because the reality of the hand holding the bowling ball was destroyed when everything changed. Where did that reality go? Well. Remember, by Hume's ultimate "dead end", we have no reason to suppose that object B actually is the effect of A. By his reasoning. I ask, where did object B come from?

So we have an object A that was utterly destroyed, and we have an object B that was created out of nothing? I don't think so. I think, actually, that no destruction nor creation has taken place, but that the cause of the hand holding the bowling ball became the effect of the ball lying on the floor. To explain: An instant A does not equal an Instant B, but in the sense that A = A, and in the sense that B = B, if A becomes B, then in all truthfullness, to examine A is to Examine B at a later time, but the relationship between the two comes clear when we realize that A does indeed = B!

Think about it. The reason object B follows object A so much(the letting go of the bowling ball), is because the two objects are linked by another axiom of Identity. The axiom of identity with assurance from change! For example, it has been long held that if you melt a candle, what happened to the original candle, and where did the melted wax come from? The axiom of identity with assurance from change spells it out: The current reality of the object is the melted wax, but the impression of the candle can be found in it!

Given this, it becomes crystal clear that hume was wrong. So long as two objects do not exist simultaneously, you can find the impression of the one in the other. Thus, examining object A, if it precedes object B in succession, one can find in object A the impression for object B. What is the impression, you might ask? It is identity. The axiom of identity. Object A is object B, and thus, since the two objects are not separate, to look at one is to look at the impression of the other as far as the possibilities of change may go!

Hume was wrong. Up to this point, modern philosophy has held that Hume brought John Locke's philosophical treatises to their logical grave. But Hume didn't dig deep enough. In the same way, I will not make the same mistake. This new axiom, The axiom of Identity with assurance from change, is probably not the bottom of the barrel. But it is an important advance. It is the resurrection of Lockian philosophy; locke still has a ways to go. Interesting.

I look forward to the conundrums this new axiom may produce.

Estoy frente a mi libro de filosofía de segundo de bachillerato, lo cual puede resultar sorprendente para quien sepa que estoy en tercero de carrera. Os explicaré por qué.

Para que lo entendáis bien tengo que remontarme hasta las épocas en las que la filosofía comenzó a gustarme. Estaba yo en primero de bachillerato, amargado porque era incapaz de aprobar las asignaturas de mi especialidad (matemáticas, física y tecnología industrial), despotricando sobre la mierda de sistema educativo/formativo que tenemos, que te obliga con quince años a decidir cuál será tu oficio, tu carrera, tu futuro, en un momento en el que no puedes decidir ni siquiera el bar al que irás a tomar una caña el sábado con los amigos. La historia y la filosofía eran mis favoritas, pero no les veía ningún futuro, así que opté por una rama científico-técnica. Craso error. Me dí cuenta de ello el día que empecé segundo de bachillerato por segunda vez con solo tres asignaturas (¿adivináis cuáles?).

Cuando al fin entré en filosofía, estaba feliz. Más feliz de lo que nadie puede imaginar. La gente era genial, las asignaturas, maravillosas, los profesores (la mayoría) muy buenos. Mi primer año de carrera fue perfecto. Aprendí como nunca antes lo había hecho. Además, aprobé, pero eso lo consideraba secundario. Gozaba aprendiendo, leyendo, redactando trabajos y comentarios.

En segundo todo iba igual, lo cual no es malo hasta que te das cuenta de que has caido en una espiral de rutina, repetición y aburrimiento. Aun así, descubrir la filosofía árabe, o las teorías antropológicas, o la filosofía de la mente, salvó aquel año, que en principio pintaba muy mal.

Tercero ha sido uno de los peores años de mi vida. He sufrido el tedio más absoluto, he pasado de adorar la filosofía y defenderla a capa y espada a renegar de todos los aburridos charlatanes que se inventan palabras con el único fin de llenar más páginas. He visto el lado oscuro de la carrera, y no me ha gustado. Me he encontrado con profesores en cuyas clases lo más provechoso que puedes hacer es dormir, cuyos apuntes, libros y explicaciones van de una incomprensibilidad absoluta a un "no tiene nada que ver" con lo que estudias. Han encorsetado la maravillosa labor de redactar un trabajo, han vuelto a la insulsa e ineficiente técnica del examen anual, obligando a los alumnos a estudiar largos párrafos de extrañas palabras.

He descubierto por qué la gente suele odiar la filosofía y a los filósofos. He visto lo que todos me decían: "todos los filósofos están locos, aburren a una ostra y no hay quien les entienda". He visto el final del sentido común en la educación, el triste cementerio donde reposa el buen hacer del profesorado, y la desidia que cae a plomo sobre los hombros desvalidos del ilusionado estudiante.

El ejemplo de todo lo que digo está en mi mesa. Tengo a mi lado los libros de historia de la filosofía de Copleston, los apuntes y libros de los profesores que imparten las asignaturas que curso, los resúmenes y apuntes de varias personas que han acudido a lo largo del tiempo a sus clases. Y lo único que me sirve en mi labor de estudio es mi libro de bachillerato.

Si Hume levantara la cabeza se cagaría encima de la pila de libros y apuntes que se acumulan en mi mesa (perdón por la expresión, no soy yo, es la indignación la que habla). Para ésta mierda, es mejor tener la tábula rasa que caracteriza la filosofía de Locke.

Un triste saludo desde mi agónico lugar de estudio, mientras mis neuronas y mi energía se pudren entre las confusas palabras de aquellos que nacieron para aburrir al personal.

My eyes taste of movies,

They are coated in a film, when

Sometimes my picture goes

Flat, like mediaeval Coca-Cola

Commercials on a theater (screen circa 2002,

While I thirst for bubbles on the rocks, now.

-

The world, I suspect

Has been cropped to better fit

My head, I wonder what is missing

Beyond the edges that I can clearly see

I can’t see, or beyond.

-

And I want to poke a yellow brick hole

To the Technicolor Oz Wizard

Behind it all, fabricating,

Behind the projector that lies

Behind me? I do not know truthfully

-

Anything, but the projected that shoots

Down the throat of my eyes

Into the stomach

To sit

Real heavy Noir.

-

David Hume

Once segregated it for me,

“Your mind is the film, only,

And the rest of the theater is off limits to your kind”,

In darkness, human with the montage of a totalitarian director,

-

The meaning of it?

I think it is that(rumble(grumble(grumble(is that popcorn? (sniff)

The stomach is hungry, and asks me for popcorn to

Chase the taste away of the screen that

Holds me like a fishbowl, but it holds me like a fishbowl

-

To waiting for a gift from above. And sometimes so trick-flat,

My prison seems of glass, unnoticed construction,

And I seem to be free in my prison to go nowhere,

But more often, it enslaves openly in curves

While showing not one red exit sign opening “somewhere over the rainbow”

-

Still, my stomach stays far bigger than my eyes

Tags: poem, concession stand, hume,

Ensinnäkin, on kaksi lähtökohtaa, mistä tietoteoriaa voidaan tehdä: autonomismi ja naturalismi. Autonomistin mukaan tietoteoria on "ensimmäinen filosofia". Vasta kun olemme selvittäneet, mitä ajattelemme tiedosta ja tietämisestä, voimme alkaa pohtia muita asioita ja esimerkiksi tekemään tiedettä. Naturalisti puolestaan lähtee tekemään tietoteoriaa kaiken sen kokemuksen perusteella, mitä hänellä on. Hän voi siis käyttää tietoteoreettiseen argumentointiinsa vaikkapa tieteellisiä (vaikkapa kognitiotieteellisiä tai neurologisia) tuloksia. Yllättäen keskitie kuulostaa kaikkein houkuttelevimmalta, mutta lähtökohtaisesti ponnistan enemmän autonomismin puolelta.

Skeptikkoja: paetkoon ken voi!

Epäileminen on vapauttavaa, koska aika usein asiat eivät ole sillä tavalla kuin kuvittelemme niiden olevan. Historiaa ei tarvitse kauaa tonkia esimerkkien löytämiseksi. Jos olemme aiemminkin erehtyneet, miksi emme voisi olla nykyäänkin yhtä väärässä? Onko "tietäminen" mahdollista, ja jos on, niin millä perusteella? Filosofia alkaa epäilystä, tiesi Sokrateskin.

Tietoteoreettinen skeptikko kyseenalaistaa tiedon mahdollisuuden tai vielä radikaalimmin: oikeutettujen uskomusten mahdollisuuden. Radikaalin skeptikon elämä käy hankalaksi, mutta maltillinen pystyy elämään normaalia elämäänsä uskomusten varassa, kuitenkaan luottamatta niihin absoluuttisesti. Jos halutaan rakennella elämää varmemmalle pohjalle, pitää skeptisismin haasteeseen pystyä jotenkin vastaamaan. Siksi Lammenrannan kirjassakin ensimmäinen luku käsittelee erilaisia yrityksiä ratkaista skeptisismin ongelma.

René Descartes oli myös autonomisti, sillä hän halusi tuhota maailmankuvansa ja kaikki uskomuksensa epäilyn metodillaan ja rakentaa teoriansa sellaiselle pohjalle, jota ei ole mahdollista epäillä. Descartes päätyi lopulta arveluttaviin lopputuloksiin, mutta hän tarjosi tietoteoreetikoille kuitenkin lähtökohdan, jonka avulla vastata skeptisismiin.

David Humea on yleisesti pidetty skeptikkona, joskin Lammenranta argumentoi hänen olleen todellisuudessa naturalisti. Joka tapauksessa Hume käytti skeptisiä argumentteja kieltääkseen sen, että ihmisellä voi olla tietoa mielensä ulkopuolisista objekteista. Hän oli tässä suhteessa Descartesin perillinen. Hän perusti ajattelunsa kuitenkin äärimmäiseen empirismiin: mielessämme voi olla ainoastaan aistien kautta saatuja vaikutelmia. Nuo vaikutelmat eivät kuitenkaan ole sama asia kuin ulkoiset objektit. Meillä ei ole mitään aistein saatua vaikutelmaa siitä, miten nuo vaikutelmat liittyvät mielemme ulkoisiin objekteihin. Ajatuskulku kulkee loogisesti näin:

1. Jos meillä on tietoa ulkoisista objekteista, niin ulkoiset objektit ovat joko vaikutelmia ja ideoita tai pääteltyjä vaikutelmista ja ideoista. (Empirismin lähtökohta)
2. Ulkoiset objektit eivät ole vaikutelmia ja ideoita.
3. Ulkoiset objektit eivät ole pääteltyjä vaikutelmista ja ideoista.
4. Meillä ei siis ole tietoa ulkoisista objekteista.

Kaksi Humea edeltänyttä brittiläisen empirismin keskushahmoa eivät hyväksyneet tätä päättelyä. Locke katsoi, että voimme vaikutelmista päätellä ulkoiset objektit, eli hän hylkäsi kolmannen premissin. Berkeley puolestaan hylkäsi toisen premissin ja katsoi, että ulkoiset objektit ovat vain vaikutelmia. Humen mukaan filosofia teksi meistä äärimmäisä skeptikkoja, jos luonto ei sitä estäisi. Humen naturalismin mukaan ei siis ole mahdollista olla uskomatta mielen ulkoisiin objekteihin.

Kukaan tervejärkinen ei voi olla skeptikko

Terveen järjen filosofia on aina jotenkin ärsyttänyt minua. Ehkä syy on siinä, että se kiistää sen vapauden tunteen, jonka epäileminen tarjoaa: ei tarvitse sitoutua mihinkään. Jos filosofia alkaa epäilystä, terveen järjen filosofia ei edes ole filosofiaa. Jokainen tervejärkinen tietää, että mielen ulkoiset objektit ovat olemassa. Tämän kieltävä on hullu.

Todellisuudessa terveen järjen filosofit Thomas Reid ja G.E. Moore esittivät hieman uskottavampia perusteluita ajattelunsa tueksi, minkä vuoksi minäkin voin pitää heitä oikeina filosofeina. :D Perustelu on looginen. Jos tietyistä premisseistä väistämättä seuraava johtopäätös (ulkoisten objektien kieltäminen) vaikuttaa mielettömältä, voimme yrittää kieltää jonkin premisseistä. Descartesista lähtien tietoteoreetikot ovat hyväksyneet premissiksi, että ihmisellä voi olla tietoa vain välittömistä mielensisällöistään. Terveen järjen filosofit ovat eri mieltä. He hylkäävät mielummin tämän premissin kuin ulkoisten objektien olemassaolon.

Terve järki lipsahtaa helposti dogmaattiseksi, joskaan Reidiä ja Moorea ei tästä ehkä voi syyttää. Jos väitämme tietävämme lähes kaiken, minkä luulemme tietävämme, teemme tyhjäksi filosofisen pohdiskelun. Mainituilla filosofeilla terveessä järjessä on kuitenkin kyse vain uskottavimpien premissien hyväksymisestä. Edes itsensä vakavasti ottava skeptikko ei voi hylätä kaikkia premissejä.

Filosofinen supersankari: Immanuel Kant

Otsikon on tarkoitus olla itsereflektiivinen ja sanoa ääneen se suhtautuminen, mikä minulla yleensä on Kantin filosofiaa kohtaan. Tämä reflektio ei toistaiseksi ole tehnyt hänestä minulle yhtään vähäpätöisempää, mutta olenpahan antanut sille ainakin mahdollisuuden.

Transsendentaalinen idealismi kuuluu huikeimpiin ajatusrakennelmiin, joihin olen törmännyt. Kant jakaa todellisuuden kahteen tasoon: maailmaan sellaisena kuin se on kokevasta subjektista riippumatta (eli olioihin sinänsä) ja maailmaan sellaisena kuin subjekti sen kokee (ilmiömaailma). Olioista sinänsä ei voi tietää mitään. Ilmiömaailma puolestaan ei ole sama asia kuin maailma sinänsä, sillä voimme ymmärtää maailmaa ainoastaan mielemme rakenteiden avulla. Kant sanoi näitä ymmärryksen kategorioiksi. Maailma sellaisena kuin sen havaitsemme on siis osittain oman mielemme luomus.

Antirealismi ja konstruktivismi

Vaikka Kant sanoo transsendentaalisen idealismin olevan ainoa tapa, jolla voidaan sanoa mitään ulkomaailmasta (eli siis ainoa mahdollinen realismin muoto), on helppo yhtyä Lammenrannan väitteeseen, että Kant on melko kaukana realismista. Itse asiassa hän aika pitkälti hyväksyy skeptikon väitteet. Olioiden sinänsä suhteen Kant on antirealisti. Kantilainen antirealismi on varsin suosittua, etenkin kielellisen käänteen jälkeisessä yhteiskuntatieteessä. Siinä missä Kant piti ymmärryksen kategorioita universaaleina, nuo yhteiskuntatieteilijät pitävät niitä kieli- ja kulttuurisidonnaisina. He ovat siis kulttuurirelativisteja ja konstruktivisteja. (Lammenranta käyttää tätä termiä. Sen merkitys lienee hieman tietoteoreettisempi kuin sosiaalitieteilijälle tutumman konstruktionismin, joka viittaa Bergeristä ja Luckmannista alkaneeseen sosiaalisen konstruktionismin perinteeseen.) Oma ymmärryksemme konstituoi osaltaan sen maailman, jonka havaitsemme.

Lammenranta puolustaa kuitenkin realismia argumentilla, jonka voisi kärjistäen esittää näin: eikö olisikin vaikeaa elää antirealistisen maailmankatsomuksen mukaisesti? Tosin hän perustelee realismia myös sillä, että realisti voi olla myös tietoteoreettinen naturalisti: hän voi argumentoinnissaan käyttää empiirisen tieteen saavutuksia.

Entä jos: ilkeä demoni tai hullu tieteilijä tai matrix

Descartesin epäilyn metodin voimakkain skeptinen argumentti oli, että en voi millään tietää, ettei ilkeä demoni huijaa minua jatkuvasti kaikessa siinä mitä koen. Modernin version tästä ajatuksesta esittivät tietenkin Wachowskin veljekset Matrix-elokuvissa. Loogisesti kyse on paradoksista uskomusjärjestelmässämme. Olemme lähtökohtaisesti valmiita hyväksymään seuraavat argumentit:

1. Jos tiedän, että istun kotona tietokonettani näppäillen (A), tiedän myös, etten ole kytkettyvä Matrixiin (B).
2. Tiedän, että istun kotona tietokonetta näppäillen. (A)
3. En tiedä, että en ole kytkettynä Matrixiin. (~B)

Kaikki hyväksynevät ensimmäisen argumentin. Skeptikko sen sijaan lähtee ~B:stä ja päättelee, että en tiedä, että istun kotona. Terveen järjen filosofi lähtee argumentista A ja päättelee, että B. Periaatteessa argumentit ovat tasavertaiset. Terveen järjen filosofilla tosin on enemmän menetettävää, koska hän väittää enemmän. Skeptikko sen sijaan ei saavuta juuri mitään, paitsi sen emansipoivan vapauden tunteen.

Jos jotain halutaan saavuttaa, on minunkin terveen järjen kriitikkona syytä hyväksyä ainakin osia siitä. Peirce katsoi olevansa kriittinen terveen järjen filosofi ja fallibilisti (joka ei väitä tietävänsä mitään varmasti). Hän siis lähtee siitä, mitä luulee tietävänsä, ja korjaa uskomuksiaan tarpeen mukaan.

Terveen järjen poliittisuus

Yksi aihepiiri, jota Lammenranta ei käsittele, on politiikka. Filosofina se ei ehkä kuulu hänen intresseihinsä. Voiko kuitenkaan olettaa, että ihminen joka väittää ajattelevansa kuten Peirce, todella korjaisi näkemyksiään, jos ne osoittautuvat epäedullisiksi hänelle itselleen? Antonio Gramscikin huomautti, että "terve järki" on yksi keskeisimpiä ideologisen kamppailun välineitä. Tietenkään tämä ei tarkoita, että terveen järjen filosofit, varsinkin kriittiset kuten Peirce, ajautuisivat väistämättä ajamaan omia etujaan. Katsoisin kuitenkin, että heille se on todennäköisempää kuin vaikkapa skeptikolle tai kantilaiselle konstruktivistille. Lammenranta itse sanoo, että ihmisillä on taipuvaisuus konservatiivisuuteen uskomusjärjestelmiensä suhteen: he eivät mielellään vaihda uskomuksiaan. Ja edelleen: terveen järjen filosofilla, joka on tietyllä tavalla sitoutunut uskomusjärjestelmäänsä, on enemmän menetettävää kuin skeptikolla.

Terveen järjen puolustaminen voi olla oikeutettua, jos argumentoidaan pelkästään loogisella tasolla. Jos sen sijaan muistaa oman erehtyväisyytensä (tässä tapauksessa kykenemättömyytensä elämään jatkuvasti filosofiansa mukaisesti) ja sen sosiologisen perusasian, että ihminen on myös yhteiskuntansa muovaama, on ehkä turvallisempaa olla konstruktivisti.

Uskon, että kirjan kahdessa muussa luvussa (Tieto ja Oikeutus) Lammenranta perustelee terveen järjen filosofiaa ja naturalismia lisää. Uskon myös, että hän ei edelleenkään ota politiikkaa tai ideologiaa huomioon argumentoinnissaan, onhan kirjan tarkoitus ensisijaisesti olla tietoteorian oppikirja ja vasta toissijaisesti naturalismin puolustus.

Councillor Peter Hume (chair) Peter.Hume@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2488
Councillor Peggy Feltmate (vice chair) Peggy.Feltmate@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2752
Councillor Diane Holmes, Diane.Holmes@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2484
Councillor Clive Doucet, Clive.Doucet@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2487
Councillor Steve Desroches, Steve.Desroches@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2751
Councillor Michel Bellemare, Michel.Bellemare@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2481
Councillor Shad Qadri, Shad.Qadri@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2476
Councillor Bob Monette Bob.Monette@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2471
Councillor Gord Hunter, Gord.Hunter@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2479
Councillor Jan Harder, Jan.Harder@ottawa.ca / 613-580-2473

(T) La proposición de que p es pensada-T por nosotros si, y solo si, p

1) expresan equivalencias necesarias y 2) son cognoscibles a priori. Además, el carácter trascendental de la validez objetiva de nuestro pensamiento, así representado, no compromete al idealista con la tesis de que nuestra forma de pensar sobre las cosas constituye la forma como son las cosas. Pero, ¿qué pasa con la tesis de que el sujeto del pensamiento desaparece?

Pues bien, el carácter evanescente del sujeto trascendental puede representarse adecuadamente mediante la idea de que 3) las instancias del esquema (T) expresan también equivalencias cognitivas. Tomo la idea del deflacionismo de H. Field sobre el predicado de verdad aplicado a las oraciones de un lenguaje. Field mantiene que un esquema de equivalencia

(V*) “p” es verdadera si, y solo si, p

puede darnos el significado del predicado “es verdadera”, es decir, que el significado del predicado de verdad puede ser completamente obtenido del significado de las oraciones a las que se aplica: de otro modo, el concepto de verdad tendría un contenido que trasciende su rol desentrecomillador, que es cancelar el ascenso semántico y capacitarnos para hablar sobre el mundo hablando sobre el lenguaje. Pero, de hecho el predicado de verdad solo puede ser aplicado a oraciones que uno comprende: no cabe preguntarse si las oraciones que uno no comprende son o no son verdaderas, porque no hay más comprensión del enunciado de que una oración es verdadera que una comprensión de la oración misma. De manera que una oración de la forma “‘p’ es verdadera” y una oración de la forma “p” tienen el mismo sentido: las instancias del esquema (V*) expresan equivalencias cognitivas. Ahora bien, puede afirmarse que las instancias del esquema de equivalencia

(V) La proposición de que p es verdadera si, y solo si, p

también expresan (y con mayor razón) equivalencias cognitivas: comprender el enunciado de que una proposición es verdadera es pensar la proposición misma.

Análogamente, la jugada del idealista consistente en apuntarse a 3) es decir que una oración de la forma “La proposición de que p es pensada-T por nosotros” y una oración de la forma “p” tienen el mismo sentido: comprender el enunciado de que una proposición es pensada-T por nosotros es pensar la proposición misma. El significado del predicado “es pensada-T por nosotros” es completamente derivado de las proposiciones de que se predica, y su única función es cancelar el ascenso semántico y capacitarnos para hablar sobre el mundo hablando sobre las proposiciones que pensamos: hablar de nuestra forma de pensar sobre las cosas no tiene más contenido que hablar de la forma como son las cosas! El concepto de pensar que p trascendentalmente no tiene un contenido que trascienda la función de capacitarnos para pensar desde dentro, por así decirlo, que p. No es como si dejásemos de pensar que p para pensar solamente en el carácter trascendental de nuestro pensamiento, en cuyo caso el carácter trascendental de nuestro pensamiento ocuparía toda la escena pensante: es, más bien, como si pensásemos que p desde el carácter trascendental de nuestro pensamiento, en cuyo caso p (y no nuestro pensamiento) ocupa toda la escena trascendental. La desaparición del sujeto trascendental no es, obviamente, la desaparición de un punto de vista trascendental (con el contenido p) con respecto a la forma como son las cosas sino que es la desaparición de un punto de vista trascendente (con un contenido propio que no es p) con respecto al mundo.

Es importante que no haya un malentendido sobre lo que estoy afirmando. No estoy afirmando que el idealista tenga que negar la práctica habitual de referirse a la forma de pensar de alguien en contraposición a la forma como son las cosas. El idealista no tiene que negar que, por ejemplo, tenga sentido decir “Pepe piensa que la hierba es roja pero la hierba no es roja”. Pero, una cosa es un pensamiento trascendental y otra cosa es un pensamiento empírico ordinario: una cosa es el pensamiento de un sujeto trascendental y otra cosa es el pensamiento de un sujeto empírico. En términos de una concepción plural del sujeto trascendental es más fácil entender el asunto. Si nosotros estamos en la posición de decir “Pepe piensa que la hierba es roja pero la hierba no es roja”, es que la hierba no es roja, así que la proposición de que la hierba es roja no es pensada-T por Pepe (pues, no es pensada por nosotros) y, por tanto, decir eso no es formular un contraejemplo a la validez universal del esquema (T) ni tampoco a la tesis de que las instancias del esquema (T) expresan equivalencias cognitivas. Es evidente, debido a anomalías que no tienen que ver con el idealismo trascendental (sino con la naturaleza de la primera persona), que no estamos en la posición de decir “Nosotros pensamos que la hierba es verde pero la hierba no es verde”. Pero, si el idealismo trascendental fuera correcto, habría razones trascendentales por las que es lógicamente imposible decirlo: sería contradictorio aseverar a la vez que pensamos que la hierba es verde y que la hierba no es verde.

Supongamos ahora que nosotros somos X. Si X solo fuera una comunidad empírica entre otras, entonces tendría sentido que una comunidad empírica Y dijera “X piensa que la hierba no es roja pero la hierba es roja”. Supongamos, además, que la comunidad Y tuviera razón (lo que a nivel de comunidades empíricas también tiene sentido). Entonces, esta hipótesis cuenta directamente como un caso contra el idealismo trascendental. Pues, después de todo, la hierba es roja, pero la proposición de que la hierba es roja no es pensada por nosotros (ni puede ser pensada-T por nosotros) y, por tanto, la hipótesis es un contraejemplo a la validez universal del esquema (T) y a la tesis de que las instancias del esquema (T) expresan equivalencias cognitivas. Por otra parte, si X es una comunidad trascendental, no tiene sentido decir “X piensa que la hierba no es roja pero la hierba es roja”: sería una consecuencia trivial del idealismo trascendental que la hierba no es roja, así que, por definición, no es un caso contra el idealismo trascendental ni tampoco contra la tesis 3). No voy a profundizar más sobre esta cuestión, y es que en su momento le dedicaré al menos un ‘post’.

Paso ahora, como anuncié en el primer ‘post’, a ocuparme de una explicación humeana de la posesión del concepto de idealismo trascendental. De nuevo es pertinente establecer una comparación con la explicación minimalista de la posesión del concepto de verdad. Según 3) la comprensión de una instancia del esquema (V) no consiste más que en captar o pensar la proposición referida en esa instancia. Pero, poseer el concepto de verdad es, sin duda, estar en condiciones de comprender cada instancia del esquema (V). Entonces, la posesión del concepto de verdad no puede demandar la posesión de conceptos explicativos más básicos que los que son demandados para la captación de cualquier proposición: por ejemplo, la comprensión de la instancia del esquema (V) para la proposición La hierba es verde no demanda un equipaje conceptual superior al que es necesario para poder pensar que la hierba es verde. Esto significa que la posesión del concepto de verdad no es dependiente de la posesión de conceptos explicativos como el concepto de correspondencia con el mundo. Téngase en cuenta que no estoy repitiendo el punto (del primer ‘post’) de que la propiedad de la verdad no puede ser explicada en términos de la propiedad de la correspondencia con el mundo, algo que tenía que ver con la naturaleza misma de la verdad: el punto de ahora es que la posesión del concepto de verdad no puede ser explicada en términos de la posesión del concepto de correspondencia con el mundo, algo que tiene que ver con la naturaleza de nuestro pensamiento (sobre la verdad).

Ahora bien, supongamos que captar o pensar una proposición superviene en una propiedad del significado como uso de los miembros de una clase de oraciones: digamos, por ejemplo, que el pensamiento de que la hierba es verde superviene en la propiedad de estar dispuesto a asentir a la oración del español “La hierba es verde”. En ese caso, es una consecuencia de la tesis 3) que la comprensión de una instancia del esquema (V) superviene en la propiedad de estar dispuesto a asentir a esa instancia del esquema (V). Luego, si poseer el concepto de verdad es estar en condiciones de comprender cada instancia del esquema (V), el concepto de verdad superviene en una propiedad del significado como uso: poseer el concepto de verdad es estar dispuesto a asentir a cada instancia del esquema (V). El eco humeano de estas consideraciones debe también ser evidente: poseer el concepto de verdad no consiste más que en la inevitabilidad subjetiva de que una naturaleza humana como la nuestra esté dispuesta a asentir a cada instancia del esquema (V).

El movimiento a una explicación humeana de la posesión del concepto de idealismo trascendental es inmediato. De entrada, según 3) la comprensión de una instancia del esquema (T) no consiste más que en captar o pensar la proposición referida en esa instancia. Poseer el concepto de idealismo trascendental es, sin duda, estar en condiciones de comprender cada instancia del esquema (T). Entonces, la posesión del concepto de idealismo trascendental no puede demandar la posesión de conceptos explicativos más básicos que los que son demandados para la captación de cualquier proposición. Así que la posesión del concepto de idealismo trascendental no es dependiente de la posesión de conceptos explicativos como el concepto de constitución del mundo. En el primer ‘post’ argumenté que no veía objeciones de peso a que la propiedad de ser pensado-T por nosotros pueda ser explicada finalmente en términos de la propiedad de ser constituyente del mundo. Sin embargo, sostuve que el carácter trascendental de la validez objetiva de nuestro pensamiento no incluye necesariamente un compromiso con una explicación última de la naturaleza misma del carácter trascendental en cuestión. Pero, el punto de ahora es que la posesión del concepto de idealismo trascendental (es decir, la posesión del concepto de ser pensado-T por nosotros) no puede ser explicada en términos de la posesión del concepto de ser constituyente del mundo, algo que tiene que ver con nuestro pensamiento (sobre el carácter trascendental de la validez objetiva de nuestro pensamiento): no hay una explicación última de nuestro pensamiento al respecto.

Supongamos, entonces, que pensar una proposición superviene en una propiedad del significado como uso, la disposición a asentir a los miembros de una clase de oraciones. Entonces, es una consecuencia de la tesis 3) que la comprensión de una instancia del esquema (T) tiene que supervenir en una disposición a asentir a esa instancia del esquema (T). Luego, si poseer el concepto de idealismo trascendental es estar en condiciones de comprender cada instancia del esquema (T), poseer el concepto de idealismo trascendental es tener una disposición a asentir a cada instancia del esquema (T). Es importante enfatizar el alcance de la idea wittgensteiniana de que el significado es el uso para el tema que nos ocupa: que poseer el concepto de idealismo trascendental es estar en condiciones de comprender cada instancia del esquema (T) no quiere decir ya que el concepto de idealismo trascendental nos guía en la comprensión y, por tanto, en la disposición a asentir a cada instancia del esquema (T), sino que la disposición a asentir a cada instancia del esquema (T) es poseer el concepto de idealismo trascendental. Aquí es donde una explicación humeana de la posesión del concepto entra en problemas: es claramente falso (o al menos completamente implausible) que poseer el concepto de idealismo trascendental consista en la inevitabilidad subjetiva de que una naturaleza humana como la nuestra esté dispuesta a asentir a cada instancia del esquema (T). En otras palabras, es falso o implausible que todos los que poseemos o podemos poseer el concepto de idealismo trascendental somos o vayamos a ser idealistas! (señalo, de paso, que el escollo fundamental para un asentimiento a cada instancia del esquema (T) está en asentir a una lectura de derecha a izquierda de esa instancia: por ejemplo, si la hierba es verde, entonces la proposición de que la hierba es verde es pensada-T por nosotros).

Pero, la cosa no presenta una solución fácil para el idealista. De hecho el idealista trascendental enfrenta un dilema. O bien renuncia a la tesis de que 3) las instancias del esquema (T) expresan equivalencias cognitivas, en cuyo caso el sujeto trascendental, después de todo, no desaparece y el idealismo kantiano es un tipo de subjetivismo humeano, o bien renuncia a la tesis de que pensar una proposición superviene en una propiedad del significado como uso, en cuyo caso el idealismo trascendental es un tipo de platonismo encubierto, donde algo semejante a la intuición intelectual de una proposición es constitutivo de nuestro pensamiento.

http://app01.ottawa.ca/postingplans/appDetails.jsf?lang=en&appId=__671474

On the page, there is a link to three documents prepared, I believe, by the planner: (1) Site Serving Report, (2) Traffic Impact Assessment and the Traffic Impact Assessment attachment (3). I have only been able to open the Traffic Impact Assessment so far.

There is also a good website feature at the bottom of the page that allows you to provide comments to the planner. Your comments could also be sent to Councillor Hume and any other city councillor and Mayor O’Brien, simply by checking off the appropriate boxes.

Make your comments now!

Ci sono al mondo due tipi di scienze. La fisica e la matematica tendono ad essere scienze sintetiche, cercano cioè di ricondurre le innumerevoli manifestazioni della natura a pochi principi primi comprensibili, basandosi sull'assunzione che la natura stessa possegga una intrinseca struttura logica e conoscibile. La biologia, la chimica, la medicina sono invece scienze analitiche, prendono come punto di partenza per la loro indagine l'ipotesi operativa che la natura abbia troppe diverse sfaccettature per poter essere racchiusa in semplici schemi mentali.

Le metodologie di lavoro delle scienze sintetiche favoriscono appunto la sintesi, la compattezza. Per un matematico, una formula lunga e complessa è molto meno elegante di un'altra più breve e densa di significati. Ecco allora che sorge l'uso del linguaggio simbolico, delle variabili, delle equazioni. Il loro valore risiede proprio nella capacità di concentrare infiniti problemi, situazioni ed esempi in poche lettere. Questo densità conoscitiva è anche la fonte delle difficoltà di interpretazione che molti studenti incontrano nelle lezioni di matematica o di fisica. La conoscenza viene trasmessa in maniera discontinua, a salti: ogni equazione è come un autocarro di informazioni, che vanno considerate, valutate, ordinate, ricordate.

Le scienze analitiche, al contrario, trovano questo modo di procedere scomodo e restrittivo. Non c'è speranza di comprimere tutte le malattie infettive in una formula matematica: sono troppe e troppo variegate nelle loro manifestazioni! Di conseguenza, il lavoro degli scienziati analitici consiste principalmente nel produrre imponenti liste e enormi cataloghi, contenenti tutto lo scibile raccolto. I libri di biologia sono, per gran parte, dei lunghi elenchi delle strutture biologiche e delle loro rispettive proprietà. Lo studio delle materie analitiche è quindi più progressivo, una tabella oggi, una descrizione domani, e così via. Lo svantaggio principale di questo sistema è che i tempi di apprendimento si dilatano notevolmente: non a caso i medici studiano dieci e più anni all'università. In altre parole, in questi campi non è tanto utile l'abilità di padroneggiare i significati intrinseci e comtemporanei di una nozione compatta, quanto la memoria e la porosità mentale ai numerosissimi nuovi concetti.

Nelle storie della filosofia e della scienza si trovano opinioni diverse sul significato di legge naturale. Posto che la gravità è di certo una legge naturale, come possiamo verificare ogni volta che inciampiamo e ci rompiamo il naso - o anche no! - che dire dell'elenco di tutti gli insetti che popolano la foresta? E' anch'essa una legge naturale, oppure no? Kant avrebbe risposto negativamente: "La biologia non sarà mai una scienza!". In effetti, se consideriamo, per rimanere nell'esempio, questa lista come una legge naturale al pari della gravità, che fare quando una specie si estingue, magari per cause umane? La legge naturale non è più valida, o va solo cambiata? Ma si potrà cambiare una legge naturale per conseguenza dell'attività umana?

La mia opinione in proposito è la seguente. E' assurdo considerare le leggi naturali come immutabili, siano esse anche le più convincenti e generali, come la gravità o le equazioni di Maxwell. Niente e nessuno ci garantisce, come già aveva visto Hume, che l'attrazione tra i pianeti non cambi con il tempo, né che la Terra non smetta di esistere domani mattina. Certo, il mondo gira intorno al Sole da miliardi di anni e sembra piuttosto - meglio, molto - improbabile che questo meccanismo smetta di funzionare da un giorno all'altro. Tuttavia esempi meno estremi di questo, come i cambiamenti nei sintomi delle malattie o le modifiche genetiche nei batteri, appaiono molto più convincenti. In definitiva, siamo noi a dover decidere quale confidenza attribuire ad ogni legge, principio, elenco o esperimento. Siamo noi stessi, noi scienziati, studenti, profani ad attribuire alla scienza il suo valore. La scienza vive della nostra fiducia in essa.

Early in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume draws what is minimally a conceptual distinction between two types of knowledge. On the hand are what he calls "relationships of ideas," which include mathematics and any other sort of thinking whereby propositions are intuitively or demonstrably discovered. On the other hand are the broad and seemingly boundless "matters of fact," which are conclusions and assertions whose arrival necessitates moving beyond the operation of thought, as well as beyond experience: "All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be based on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can beyond the evidence of our memory and sense" (ECHU 22).

Hume's criticism of the customary affirmation of the a priori rule of causality is well known and needs only fleeting mention here. For Hume, the relation of cause and effect arises out of experience and habitual expectation rather than out of any a priori reasoning. He rejects the notion that the mind can ever discover the effect in a given cause. And so, he reasons, the mind must "invent or imagine" each scenario of a particular and peculiar effect proceeding by necessity from a cause. Now, Hume does not deny that causality is something real; rather, he holds that the mind cannot discover this principle intuitively or demonstrably and extend it to any future event.

At the conclusion of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume places the consideration of beauty and taste within the enquiries of matters of fact. The implication, of course, is that any "standard of taste" would inevitably be denied any intuitive or demonstrative value. Accordingly, "Of the Standard of Taste" carries out an investigation of taste in a strictly empirical mode. Thus, the full scope of "Of the Standard of Taste" is premised upon an epistemological position that, incidentally, has been seriously challenged by philosophers, not least of whom is Immanuel Kant, whose discovery of the synthetic a priori threatens the validity of Hume's position on the purely experiential arrival at any rule of causality. It seems to me that Hume's aesthetics cannot get off the ground without the validity of his epistemological division between relations of ideas and matters of fact.

Curiously, not only does Hume assume his tenuous epistemological commitments in "Of the Standard of Taste," but he also seems to assume an intuitive principle of causality in his formulation of that sought-after standard. He asserts: "It must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings [of beauty and deformity]" (Paragraph 16). Remarkably, it appears that Hume is stealing a card from John Locke's deck, suggesting that there are "qualities" in objects that cause or "produce" the particular and varying feelings of beauty and deformity. Recall that Locke forwarded a casual theory of perception whereby the arrangement and power of "primary qualities" in objects produce the "secondary qualities" of perception. It appears that Hume has allowed this empiricist claim to slip in the backdoor of his aesthetics, committing him to a position that he actually rejects in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, that is, that any rule of causality is an invention of the mind and not a principle that resides in the actual objects of perception. Hume seems to suggest that the standard of taste that arises out of the "uniform consent of nations and ages" is based upon qualities in objects that consistently cause certain sentiments (albeit in those who have a rather advanced "delicacy of taste"). And yet, how can Hume make this claim in "Of the Standard of Taste" when he denied in the Enquiry that causality is a knowable fact in reality?

My intent here is only to point out that Hume's aesthetics are problematic in at least ways: 1. His aesthetics assumes a dubious epistemological distinction; 2. His aesthetics seems to violate his theory of causality, which is a constitutive aspect of the distinction. Am I being unfair to Hume?