Das Postkartenbuch.

Das Prinzip ist ganz einfach, ihr gebt bei euren gemeinsamen Freunden in Auftrag, dass sie alle eine unterschiedliche Postkarte kaufen (oder eventuell sogar selber basteln??) und dazu sollen sie natürlich eine kleine Botschaft für euren Freund schreiben. Am schönsten ist es natürlich wenn die Karten richtig verschickt wurden mit Marken und Stempel, aber wenn ihr alle im gleichen Ort wohnt dann geht das auch ohne. Dann kommt der gestalterische Teil in dem ihr die Karten arrangieren sollt, in einem Buch oder Ordner, whatever, das ist total euch überlassen. Wenn die Karten gestempelt sind sollte man das natürlich sehen können, das heißt in einem Ordner sind Klarsichthüllen zu empfehlen und bei einem Buch könnt ihr normale Umschläge auf die Seite kleben in die die Karten dann kommen damit der Soldat sie einfach da raus ziehen kann.

Natürlich sollte ach das Buch gestaltet werden, steckt so richtig Energie und Zeit da rein, und schickt es ihm oder gebt es ihm wenn er wieder da ist da die Jungs im Einsatz oftmals nicht viel Platz haben zum Verstauen von Sachen.

Ich persönlich mach das auch grad (der große Vorteil ist dass man es auch zwischen ganz normalen Freunden basteln kann und es nicht einer "richtigen" Freundin vorbehalten ist *g*) und lass mir die Karten dafür vor allem von angels aus Soldiers' Angels schicken. Zur Sicherheit der Soldaten solltet ihr sie nicht ihnen direkt schicken lassen sondern wirklich euch selbst. Gebt bei Leuten die ihr nicht 100% kennt nur seinen Namen raus, das resultiert dann in folgendes:

Name des Soldaten

c/o

eure Adresse

Kommt sicher an :)

Mit dem Buch zeigt ihr dem entsprechenden Soldaten ganz einfach dass es einige Leute gibt die an ihn denken und ihn vermissen, eine Botschaft die sicherlich gut aufgenommen wird, genauso wie eure Arbeit de ihr in das Buch gesteckt habt :)

Have fun angeling,

Ansotica

Ba sa mor eu asta e zisa la sentiment ... Felinarul din coltul blocului stie multe dar nu zice nimic. Un suflet ce nu misca trecut prin multe. Un semn de melancolie si de amintire. Pentru unii nu inseamna nimic dar pentru altii reprezinta multe... reprezinta primul sarut, prima bila bagata, prima tigara fumata, prina amenda luata si apoi aruncata, prima bataie furata si apoi mai tarziu returnata, prima bara bara cazuta, prima bere bauta si aruncata... si multe alte lucruri care teau marcat o data. Nu ignorati ceea ce nu va intereseaza ca poate pentru altii conteaza. O adevarata poveste un adevarat soldat imbracat in verde. Respect pentru soldatu din colt de le la blocu meu...

Benny Ciaramello  als Darren, der die Hirnchirugie braucht und David Giuntoli als Todd zur "Unterstützung"

Folgendes: Soldat in Afghanistan im Einsatz, er vermeldet dass euer Brief angekommen ist und ergeht sich die nächsten Zeilen (der mail) darüber, dass er jetzt aber auch langsam mal wieder schreiben muss, er muss sich endlich mal auf seinen Hintern setzen, sonst bekommt er ein schlechtes Gewissen. Wie gesagt, diese Botschaft in allen Variationen über 10 Zeilen.

Das schreit einfach nur noch nach dem "erlösenden" Satz, nämlich dass er gar nicht antworten braucht, sei es weil ihr selber einfach nur zu gern Briefe schreibt, es aber auch ohne weiteres überlebt wenn er nicht zurückschreibt. Man beachte in dieser Sache bitte auch dass wir regelmäßig übers Internet kommunizieren. Macht ihm glaubhaft dass ihr nicht daheim sitzt wie eine Glucke und nur darauf wartet dass von ihm was kommt (selbst wenn es so sein sollte), das würde sein Unbehagen nur verstärken und eure Jungs haben weiß Gott mit anderen Sachen zu tun als sich auch noch um eure Sorgen zu kümmern. Ich sag nicht dass ihr euch ihm nicht mitteilen sollt, aber so dauer-gejammer und Ansprüche stellen dass er euch was schicken muss sonst seid ihr sauer könnt ihr einfach mal schlucken! bzw MÜSST. Erklärt ihm dass ihr den Kontakt der eh schon übers Netz oder SMS whatever besteht schon in vollen Zügen genießt, dass ihr froh seid wenn er seine Zeit zum schlafen, essen oder zur sonstigen Erholung nutzen kann und dass ihr euch voll im Klaren seid dass ihr keinerlei Ansprüche habt in der Einsatzzeit. Das Wichtigste ist ihn und eure Beziehung (sei nur Freundschaft oder Partner) da durch zu bringen, und mit Gemaule wird das nichts.

Steckt also zurück, ich weiß es ist nicht leicht, aber steckt freiwillig zurück und zeigt ihm das auch. Dann kann er sich sicher sein dass er Rückendeckung hat und kann sich auf den Weg direkt vor ihm konzentrieren um hinterher wieder sicher bei euch zu landen.

In diesem Sinne...

Ansotica

Ce matin, sur l'autoroute, alors que je tentais de me réveiller et de reprendre un rythme "normal", je vois une file de véhicules de l'armée.

Je vous ai mis l'image qui pourrait ressembler à ce que j'ai vu, sauf que c'était peut être un peu plus bas.

Ces "voitures" là, il y en avait un paquet ! Bon, je n'y connais rien dans le domaine de l'armée, mais j'étais stupéfaite de voir qu'une partie de l'argent qu'on me prend sert à faire circuler sur l'autoroute, à vitesse réduite (pour économiser sans doute l'argent du contribuable), des engins pareils.

Je ne peux m'empêcher de penser qu'en qu'à de guerre, ce n'est pas du 60 à l'heure et une taille pareille qui va nous protéger de quoi que ce soit...

Je me demande même ce que tous ces braves soldats faisaient à 7h du matin sur l'autoroute...

Bon, il est vrai que j'avais entendu à la radio que nos feuilles de déclaration de revenus allaient bientôt nous tomber dans nos boîtes aux lettres et qui dit feuilles dit impôts et qui dit impôts dit dépenses de l'Etat...

Or, si je ne m'abuse, on recherche de partout les économies. Donc, j'étais trés agacée.

Heureusement, il existe des frappés qui roulent avec des grosses "voitures"

 et qui vous lancent des appels de phares pendant  tout le temps que vous OSEZ doubler à 130 km/h sur autoroute ...

Sachant que l'attente pour vous dépasser est proportionnelle à l'accélération qui s'en suivra quand vous vous serez rabattu, il y a de fortes chances qu'ils contribuent largement à l'entretien des véhicules dont nous parlions précédemment ! et paf ! (si toutefois il y a un radar volant à cette heure là sur cette autoroute là, ce dont je doute, mais j'en rêve !)

Désolée de dépeindre une image négative du conducteur de 4X4, mais celui là, en plus, s'était collé une paire de lunettes de soleil sur le nez alors que le soleil n'avait pas encore trouvé de chemin entre les nuages.

Je vous épargne la description du geste qu'il m'a fait en me doublant... c'était à son image : vulgaire.

    hi hi hi ... je n'ai pas pu m'empêcher !

[Image from University of Texas Library]

The President did change the strategy. Belatedly towards the end of his term, perhaps concerned more for his legacy than the war's consequences for the country (much less for conditions in the "free world," much less for conditions in the Middle East, much less for conditions in Iraq), President Bush in January 2007 commits 20,000 more troops in Iraq (in addition to the 130,000 already there), the first of such "augmentations." As the leadership changes face from General George Casey to General David Petraeus, the plan supported by National Security Adviser / Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice (adopted from Colonel McMaster), "clear, hold, and build," is finally taken up. Finally, American forces get the manpower resources that they need.

Question is: Did it work? Is it working? Will its gains (if there are in fact gains) last? As early as December 2007, Iraq expert and war critic Juan Cole challenges claims about the tide turning. Helping us navigate through the muddle of claims, Cole points out that in its initial phase the surge led to an equally striking surge of violence (perhaps expected, since the surge of American troops were there to "pacify") that only calmed down somewhat when its goals were achieved--i.e. the goals not of the American army, but of the battling factions--as, for example, when the Shi'ites managed to turn Baghdad into a overwhelmingly Shi'ite city, i.e. when the battling factions have been separated and have, well, killed each other off, accomplished their goals--such that there is no one left to kill (for the meantime); hence the decline of violence (again, for the meantime).

This halt in violence, as Cole points out, is by no means permanent. Instead of reconciliation, Sunni tribesmen speak of temporary accommodation with the Americans (in which many of these "Awakening councils" men have been turned into soldiers in the "Iraqi army"), concurring with their wishes--in order that they can finish off Al Qaeda first (Bin Laden (and his fundamentalist Sunni followers), after all, did want to overthrow Saddam Hussein (with his secular government that favored the Sunnis)) (turning these two Sunni groups against each other may just be a strategic American success) and then, when that's done (and when the Americans are gone), return to the original goal: war with the Shi'ites. The prospects in this war have of late not been looking too good for the Sunnis, however, leading them to wonder whether, when the Americans leave, they would simply be left to be slaughtered (by the Shi'ites). Then again, being paid by the Americans (so that they would stop fighting with them) and receiving weapons from them (as they are incorporated into the "Iraqi army") may just be the perfect strategy to prepare for such a war.

Not even the Kurdish north has remained stable, Cole notes. Kurds, Arabs, and Turks are battling "for control of the oil-rich Kirkuk province," resulting to regular bombing raids by Turkey. Add to this benchmarks that have been reached--(sometimes ridiculously) simple benchmarks (e.g. hydrocarbon law, post offices in the capital, deba'athification, constitutional review, provincial elections) that were supposed to have been achieved long ago (delayed in the first place by the lack of a viable post-combat strategy) and the reversals in the status of Iraqi women--and one cannot but see (finally!) progress in the war (thanks to the surge!).

A little bit later (March 2008), PBS' Newshour interviews two frequent visitors to Iraq whose evaluations of the situation come from opposite sides of the discourse about it. The skeptical critic (journalist Nir Rosen, also quoted by Chomsky) reiterates pretty much the points that Cole has made, stressing that there are "virtually no mixed areas left in Iraq." He also includes to the equation Shi'ite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr and his Mahdi army, who has accepted a ceasefire with the prime minister and the Americans--so that (like their enemies the Sunnis) they can reorganize, wait it out, see the Americans leave, and then resume the fight: "purge [. . .] Sunnis from Baghdad and elsewhere," and then perhaps even replace Prime Minister Maliki himself. (This fragmentation has of late been made apparent by the Basra conflict (early April 2008) between these two Shi'ite groups.) (Is this fragmentation deliberately concocted, i.e. is it in the interest of the Americans to create a wedge between the legitimated Maliki government and militia leader Al-Sadr, he who made possible Maliki getting elected in the first place but whose influence (against the US) has consistently—alarmingly—grown? If so, wouldn’t this fragmentation—in the attempt to create a unified Iraqi national identity—backfire?)

(Lenin’s Tomb attributes Al-Sadr’s appeal to Shi’ites on its anti-occupation stance, grassroots movement, Islamic Bolshevik rhetoric, and puritan zeal. Lenin concludes:

The burdens of surival as Iraqi society collapses, as professionals in health and education and vital infrastructural areas flee, as key services degenerate and vital social safety nets disappear, tends towards increasing viciousness, clientelism, patrimonialism and sectarian competition as much as it does toward nationalism and liberation. Sadr's revolt is crucial, and its outcome will tell us a great deal about Iraq's future.)

More interesting, however, are the moves taken by the proponent of the surge. First, Mr. Kagan (military historian) does not forget to point out how little we expected of the surge (just pacify Baghdad, that's all, but look! Look at where it's gone!), not mentioning Condoleeza Rice's strategy to "clear, hold, and build" (involving as it does much more intense involvement by the military (which is why Rumsfeld did not like it, intense and involvement being contradictory to his light footprint plan)). Mr. Kagan also does not forget to say how "there's been progress on almost every one of the major pieces of benchmark legislation," not mentioning of course if they have in fact been put into law and enacted (just that "there's been progress") and forgetting to mention altogether what exactly these benchmarks are.

All of these, of course, do not measure up to Mr. Kagan's move when, in order to counter the observations and claims of his opponent, he refers to them as "a magnificent myth." Mr. Kagan is to be commended for this rhetorical move. Trying to sell an untenable strategy to an impossible war whose results sit dubious and untenably (at best), he gets to make observations about the dubiousness and temporality of its results--observations of actual (granted, they're perhaps not all like that in all areas (hopefully not)) results of the surge, the actual things that it has done--into "a magnificent myth" and by the same move make himself the sober, rational observer of what he calls as the "reality on the ground." It must have taken masterful knowledge of his opponent's claims and amazing (magnificent!) logical stunts and hours and hours of ruminating (i.e. of convincing oneself, especially as Mr. Kagan was part of the American Enterprise Institute that suggested the surge to the administration in the first place) and practicing in front of the mirror (to deliver it with just the right tone of detached and calm credibility) to do that. Kudos to Mr. Kagan!

Further later (April 2008), in tense hearings in the Senate and the House, General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker (amidst the outbreak of renewed violence in Iraq) sum up these various reports by stating that progress has been made in Iraq: progress that is significant but uneven, real but fragile and reversible. This is a safe in-between stance to take, a good way to summarize and encapsulate what both the strategy's proponents and critics are saying. Questions as to the cost of staying in Iraq have been raised in the same hearings (suddenly relevant given the troubles of the American economy), whose amounts (as some estimate them) are quite dumbfounding (which, as Bill Moyers points out, does not even take into account of many other things).

Noam Chomsky, a prominent American intellectual and political activist, mocks the idea of good news (as it stood as of February 2008, when the argument for it was easier to make) in Iraq (and other places). He starts by trying to explain the mood of the American populace (especially of the elites) in the midst of a new strategy in a wearisome war. In his words:

The liberal doves adhere to their traditional reasoning and attitudes, praying that the hawks will be right and that the US will win a victory in the land of ruin and wreck, establishing "stability," a code word for subordination to Washington's will. By and large hawks are encouraged, and doves silenced, by the good news about Iraq.

He then breaks down some of the most important "good news" of the past months. Talking about Petraeus and Crocker's previous (September 2007) report to Congress, he says:

Petraeus and Crocker provided figures to show that the Iraqi government had greatly accelerated spending on reconstruction, reaching a quarter of the funding set aside for that purpose. Good news indeed--until it was investigated by the Government Accountability Office, which found that the actual figure was one-sixth what Petraeus and Crocker reported, a 50 percent decline from the preceding year.

Which should perhaps make us wary of Petraeus and Crocker's "real but fragile and irreversible" assessment of how things stand in Iraq in April 2008.

The biting critic also weighs in on the decline of violence:

More good news is the decline in sectarian violence, attributable in part to the success of the ethnic cleansing that Iraqis blame on the invasion; there are simply fewer people to kill in the cleansed areas. But it is also attributable to Washington's decision to support the tribal groups that had organized to drive out Iraqi al-Qaeda, to an increase in US troops, and to the decision of the Mahdi army to stand down and consolidate its gains--what the press calls "halting aggression." By definition, only Iraqis can commit aggression in Iraq (or Iranians, of course).

Chomsky connects this to the question as to whether this strategy of trying to co-opt various Iraqi groups by including them into the "Iraqi army" and arming them may not simply prove to be in the end counterproductive:

Perhaps some day Baghdad and Falluja too will enjoy "electricity restored in many neighborhoods, new businesses opening and the city's main streets repaved," as in booming Grozny. Possible, but dubious, in the light of the likely consequence of creating warlord armies that may be the seeds of even greater sectarian violence, adding to the "accumulated evil" of the aggression.

After all, tribes and warlords (undermining the central government, which is not to say that Prime Minister Maliki's government is not itself committing atrocities) do continue to be influential in this part of the world. It is not unlikely that these armed men will turn to these warlords (even if the original intent is indeed to be part of a national army) especially when their sense of certainty (regarding their abilities, their communication with their allies the Americans, and the formidableness of the enemy, currently Al-Sadr's Shi'ite army (which has broken up with Maliki's government)) seems so low that they flee their posts. One is led to wonder what else low morale and the lack of a practicable sense of purpose can lead these (armed) men to do.

Chomsky also talks about concerns about American reputation in the world:

A January poll by World Learning/Aspen Institute found that "75 percent of Americans believe U.S. foreign policy is driving dissatisfaction with America abroad and more than 60 percent believe that dislike of American values (39 percent) and of the American people (26 percent) is also to blame." The perception is inaccurate, fed by propaganda. There is little dislike of Americans, and dissatisfaction abroad does not derive from "dislike of American values," but rather from acceptance of these values, and recognition that they are rejected by the US government and elite opinion [in their treatment of other peoples, such as Iraqis].

That may just be the (single) good news we were looking for.

Yet, as Chomsky himself concedes (not mocking this time), "there is good news" in Iraq. Indeed. There may still be reason to hope. Iraqis, as it turns out, find national reconciliation possible--this upon discovery that they actually have a shared belief: namely, the belief that "the U.S. military invasion is the primary root of the violent differences among them, and [that . . .] the departure of `occupying forces' [i]s the key to national reconciliation."

Perfect! We can leave (if only this administration would listen), let the (different) Iraqi (groups) have their country back (we liberated them from a dictator, right? set them free?), find their own way (which they see, after all, as "possible") to national reconciliation.

That's right. National reconciliation founded on the shared belief--the shared hatred for a common enemy: US. And once we're no longer there, there's no more big Other for them to hate--so they can turn back to each other and hate themselves ("Oh, hey, you look like me. But not really. I hate you!"). And have at it.

Iraq: (site of the world's oldest civilizations) a new nation founded on the cherished and sacred value of hatred. Wow. One can't help but be astonished at that. Yes, that's what we've done. We've gotten ourselves (voluntary, by choice) caught up in this whole context of hatred. And made things worse. Great job. Thanks America!

It's like a trap, this thing. A quagmire. There really is no answer to the question: "What is to be done?" It's impossible. It's just a total mess.

The supposed opposition to the war in the political establishment is now relegated to an extreme version of Rumsfeld's strategy. (An exception is former Democratic Senator Bob Kerrey (June 2007) who proposes something of a middle ground: no more occupation, yet no expeditious withdrawal.) There's no way to get all the troops out no matter what the candidates say and politically pressured they (whoever of them gets elected) will have to draw troop numbers down. So: we're there, we're just gonna do it half-heartedly, with the smallest amount of force possible so as (hopefully) to be invisible (to critics at home (who can vote us out of office) and in Iraq (who can bomb us)).

Extreme version of Rumsfeld's strategy. The very same one that failed so miserably and led us here in the first place.

Five years after the invasion, Frontline presents a documentary on the war in Iraq. This latest broadcast is an effort to sum up Frontline's investigations of the various phases and aspects of the war. Taken together, these reports make up an excellent archive for studying (and remembering) the war.

One important thing to remember, of course, is how the whole thing was set up: the shaping of Bush's foreign policy doctrine along Neoconservative lines (championed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney); Rumsfeld's civilian victory against and subordination of the military establishment (leading to the retirement of General Tommy Franks); Cheney's co-optation of the intelligence community (costing the career of CIA Chief George Tenet, not to mention intelligence's independence from policy (i.e. policy being based on intelligence rather than the other way around)); and Cheney's successful efforts (evading legal buffers upheld by Justice Department's John Ashcroft) to expand executive powers (which was, as it was intended, turned against regular tax-paying American citizens, i.e. curtailed civil rights). (All this was of course made possible in the first place by the installation of George W. Bush to the Presidency, thanks in part to Karl Rove's mobilization of the Conservative base through the Jesus factor.) This provided fertile ground to make and maintain the case for war in Iraq (substantiated for the most part by exiled opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi, who, with his own agenda, told his supporters what they wanted to hear) (and, let us not forget, later drumbeating on Iran).

Once set up, this impressive consolidation of power by the Neocons provided fertile ground for losing the war as well. Given virtually total control over the war, Rumsfeld (with no post-combat plan) stood over and lost the crucial first year of the invasion, committing (with Ambassador Paul Bremer) a number of strategic policy mistakes (not least the dismissal of Ba'athist party members and the dissolving of the Iraqi military (letting out thousands of jobless men (and their weapons) to the streets)), though not enough troops. Dubious military behavior (as in Haditha), the treatment of war detainees (likely not too different from the treatment of suspected Al Qaeda operatives), torture scandals (especially in Abu Ghraib), the slanted handing out of reconstruction contracts to American companies (mirroring the distribution of key government posts to Conservative cronies and loyalists), and the employment of (and greater pay to (i.e. compared to American soldiers)) private warriors--all this did nothing to quell the growing insurgency (at first Shi'ite (headed by Muqtada Al-Sadr) and then (after the Shi'ites were elected, thanks to Sunni boycott after the American offensive against Sunni fundamentalists (as opposed to the more secular Saddam Sunnis) in Fallujah) Sunni, later (manipulated by Al Qaeda(?) bombing in Samarra) turned into an open civil war between the two) (these cleavages are reflected somewhat in Iraq’s different regions), the rise of gangs, and the continued violence (in Fallujah, in Baghdad, in Basra . . .) confronted by what is a light American force, but did contribute to Al Qaeda recruitment in Iraq and the return of the Taliban in Pakistan.

Most of this is in the latest documentary. The thing that really strikes out in the summation, however, is just how extensive Rumsfeld(-Cheney)'s role was in all this. Part I traces how his superb (secretive, sidelining, bullying) political infighting skills gave Rumsfeld (against other equally able political heavyweights, notably Secretary of State Colin Powell) virtually total control over the whole thing: the unilateral decision to go to war (Should we do it?), its style, logistics, and execution (How should we go about it?), and postwar management (What should we do afterwards?). Part II then shows how--with Rumsfeld on top of the command chain (as the President, advised by the Vice President, followed the proposals of the Defense Secretary)--the war was actually executed, swift and successful in the initial offense, and afterwards a fiasco, a mess, a complete disaster--with policy (continually urged on by Rumsfeld, listened to by the President) nonetheless for five years ever firm and unchanging in its failure.

An argument stressed by Rumsfeld to the President for his exclusive aggrandized position as architect and manager of the war is that, by all means, give him 100% full accountability for the Iraq war--but first give him 100% full authority in it, to the dismissal of all other views/strategies, the exclusion of all other would-be sharers of power (notably Powell). Well, Rumsfeld had 100% full authority in the war. He had 100% control. And he failed. His (lightweight) plan flopped. It is just fitting then that he bear that 100% full accountability that he put forth as collateral for the power that he so wrongfully used. He must then take 100% full responsibility for the single most important event that precipitated American foreign policy, its standing in the world, and its leverage and relationship with other players in the world stage (especially but not only in the Middle East) getting into the current damaged, disarrayed, and unquestionably weakened state that it's in, leaving America isolated, insulated, undermined, and insecure.

After Rumsfeld (was) finally (made to) resign(ed), cunning (working from behind the scenes, safe from sacking because holding what is essentially a "ceremonial" office) co-conspirator Cheney states that "Donald Rumsfeld is the best Secretary of Defense that the United States has ever had." Rumsfeld was definitely the best of the power players (for the most part thanks to Bush's ear on Cheney's mouth) and for that he has grabbed the most power. In that sense, yes, perhaps he was the best. He was obviously smart.

But once in possession of power, Rumsfeld wielded it to turn what was a swift and successful (perhaps even impressive) military campaign into one of the biggest military fiascos in U.S. history. What kind of smart is that who so mishandles and (so quickly) squanders the power that he has gained? What kind of smart is that who formulates a new kind of warfare (the "light footprint" strategy) and, when it became evident that it wasn't working, (especially considering that it was new, that it hasn't been done before) wasn't flexible enough to change strategy, to shift course, to adapt, to consider other options, to fall back on previous techniques perhaps, or, perhaps more simply, to listen to other people, not only to political rivals but to the experts (i.e. the military commanders, i.e. those who actually know what they’re doing, or at least have some hands-on experience), to perhaps learn? What kind of smart is that who only plans for and up to the initial military confrontation, making no plans at all for what happens afterwards? What kind of smart is that who misses a crucial component of all wars? What kind of smart is that who only formulates and could only conceive of (was fixated on) one plan? (This of course says nothing of the morality of the objectives to be pursued.)

Moreover, how is this public employee of the American populace "the best" when his decisions and actions only led America to a reduced and doubted position in the world? That cannot be good for the echelons of society that Rumsfeld works for and it certainly isn't good for the American people in general (much less for the people of all of the "free world," much less for the conquered people supposed to be liberated). If anything, we all end up paying a price for the actions of this "best Secretary of Defense of the United States."

But we should not be too rash in attributing all responsibility (as he asks: “100% full accountability”) to Mr. Secretary. After all, everything that he forwarded, everything that he proposed--there was a final arbiter to all that. Rumsfeld was not the final decider. He was not the highest authority. There was someone else, someone more powerful, who could have stopped him. There was someone who could have chosen in the first place not to undertake what Rumsfeld wanted. But he did not, likely because he himself wanted it (“Let’s remember, folks. This is the same guy who threatened to kill my father!”). Wars may be planned and conducted by other men, but, after all, in the end, (just as the Frontline documentary title suggests) the war is the President's. But the President cannot be made to take 100% full accountability either. He took the nation along with him.

Denne gang er det kommet lidt tættere på mig og mine venners hverdag, for Christian Raaschou gik i min parallel-klasse på folkeskolen i Vodskov.

»Det er lige før, at jeg ikke kan finde ord længere, hvor endnu en dansk soldat er dræbt. Og det kan lyde som en gentagelse, men mine tanker er selvfølgelig først og fremmest hos den afdøde soldats familie og venner både herhjemme i Danmark og i Afghanistan«, siger Søren Gade.

Det lyder efterhånden som tomme ord fra forsvarsministeren. Gad vide hvor mange af regeringens medlemmer der har familie eller venner udsendt i Afghanistan? De burde være de første der skal ofre sig for deres egne beslutninger.

Citat fra Politiken:

"Christian Raaschou var udsendt på sin femte internationale mission for forsvaret.

Han har tidligere været udsendt både til Irak og til Afghanistan, oplyser Hærens Operative Kommando.

Christian Raaschou var med sin enhed, det mekaniserede infanterikompagni (Piranha), indsat i en større koordineret operation sammen med britiske styrker.

Under kampe med Taleban cirka 20 kilometer nordøst for byen Gereshk blev Christian Raaschou og to af hans kammerater ramt.

Evakueret med helikopter
De blev hurtigt evakueret med helikopter til felthospitalet i Camp Bastion, men Christian Raaschou var afgået ved døden, da han nåede frem.

Dagens operation havde til formål at lægge pres på Taleban i et større område lidt nord for Armadillo lejren, hvor Taleban har været aktiv i den senere tid.

Christian Rasschou tilhørte hold 5. Holdet har mistet fem soldater på kun halvanden måned og er dermed det hold danske soldater, der har haft den hårdeste start i Afghanistan."

Kilde: http://politiken.dk/indland/article489262.ece

Thema 1 heute: Feldpost. Geht natürlich über die übliche Darmstadt-Adresse und die eigene des Zurückgebliebenen. Dauer: laut Berichten anderer ca 1 Woche, bei uns bisher auf jeden Fall auch mindestens 7 Tage, denn der Brief wurde Ostern abgeschickt (das Stempeldatum wird es noch mal genau zeigen) und bisher ist er immer noch nicht da. Zusätzlich zu der großen Entfernung kommen noch die Sandstürme in A'stan dazu, die wie mein Kumpel sagt ungefähr ein mal pro Woche auftreten, während welcher natürlich keine Flugzeuge fliegen die die Post transportieren könnten. Stresst euch also nicht, Leute wenn eure Post eurer Soldaten nicht gleich ankommen und steigert euch auch nicht sofort rein à la "er schreibt doch nicht er hat bestimmt eine andere" - die lange Dauer von mindestens einer Woche ist völlig normal, vor allem wenn Feiertage mit rein spielen :o)

Apropos betrügen (Thema 2 heute): Mister F. (mein Kumpel, geben wir ihm doch einen "Namen" ) hat mir erst heute morgen gemailt dass die Stimmung zwar sexuell aufgeladen ist aber Dampf kann MANN;) nicht wirklich ablassen und äußerliche Reize würden sich auch so gut wie gar nicht bieten. Natürlich ist das keine Garantie für Treue, passieren kann es theoretisch freilich, aber ganz ehrlich: das könnten eure Soldaten auch daheim in der Kaserne wenn sie wollten, da brauchen sie nicht erst einen Einsatz dafür.

Passwort: VERTRAUEN.

Angehörige sollten meiner Meinung nach Kontakt zu anderen Angehörigen suchen die in der gleichen lage waren/ sind, inmitten einer eigenen Gemeinschaft die mit dem gesamten Thema Bundeswehr vertraut ist lässt sich die Zeit wesentlich besser überstehen als umgeben von Kommentaren von Unbedarften à la "haste dir doch selber ausgesucht", "du wusstest worauf du dich einlässt" etc bla bla bla. Online gibt es dazu einige Foren, sei es Soldatenfrauen, Angehörigenbereiche bei diversen Soldaten-communities wie das Bundeswehrforum, der Soldatentreff oder auch rein für die "Einsatzmädels" der Einsatztreff.

PASST ABER AUF welche Informationen ihr über euch und vor allem über die Soldaten ins Netz stellt, es gibt mehr als genug Personen die die klassische Schwachstelle Angehörige nach für sie wertvollen Informationen filtern und die haben beileibe nichts Gutes mit ihrem Wissen vor! schützt eure Soldaten vor Anschlägen und vergebt für sie fake Namen, gebt keine Adressen raus, sagt nicht wo sie sind, welchen Rang sie haben, was sie da unten machen, nicht wann sie hin und wieder heim fliegen, veröffentlicht keine Fotos von ihnen ohne ihr Einverständnis... Achtet auf solche "Kleinigkeiten", denn andere machen es gewiss!!!

Gamle Farhang Stjärtlapp :D

På soldat testade vi lite nya saker. I vanliga fall brukar vi köra Rambo (pilbåge som ger nästan gudomliga krafter) men nu körde vi Deathmatch med "Framstegsläge". Alltså att man får vapen efter prestation. Så i början har man bara andrahandsvapen och när man dödat andra flera gånger får man tillgång till bättre och bättre vapen. blir man dock dödad riskerar man att förlora bra vapen. Det var kul iaf, tyckte jag.

Soldier of Fortune 2 kan jag inte köra på min laptop eftersom det inte finns rätt grafikinställningar till mitt grafikkort för vista så den jobbiga OpenGL fungerar inte. Men nu när jag har min stationära fungerar det perfekt. Vi körde Elimination lite grann förut, ännu ett klassiskt spel som man nästan får rysningar av att spela igen.

Dock hade det varit roligare om det varit fler personer med och spelat. Så är det någon som känner sig sugen (både som känner oss eller inte) som läser detta så tveka inte att vara med och spela lite ibland. Om ni vågar kan ni ju alltid vara med på våran Ventrilo-kanal. Vi har riktigt skoj där, det gör spelandet ännu roligare när man kan dra massa skämt och skratta åt allting som man bara kan skriva annars (så man inte kan höra tonfallet).

Nu orkar inte jag skriva mer. Bi hörs på Hamachi!

Un match paradoxal: le Brussels a sans doute presté à son meilleur niveau pendant une heure, mais une fois dépassé, le navire (capitaine compris) a chaviré avant, sans doute, de sombrer vers les eaux profondes et agitées de D2.
Il reste 7 matches, 7 finales diront certains, 21 points encore à prendre et des adversaires considérés à la portée (ah bon?!?), Charleroi, Malines, Dender et Mouscron à affronter. Certes, l'arithmétique ne condamne pas encore le Brussels à la culbute... Le hic, c'est que le bilan chiffré de la lanterne rouge est catastrophique. En Europe, seuls Derby County et l'Uniao Leiria affichent pire bilan. De plus, le recrutement déficient, la mauvaise communication interne et/ou externe (Dimitri Mbuyu n'ose plus parler à la presse), le niveau très faible de son noyau et la gestion peu professionnelle à tous niveaux ne peuvent cacher une issue pré-annoncée.

Une petite provocation pour terminer : avoir un président omniprésent, ex-joueur pro qui dit connaître le foot (sic), est-ce vraiment une bonne chose pour un club ? Ma réponse est la suivante: oui , à condition de s'entourer de gens compétents et de déléguer un maximum (on achète pas un crayon sans l'assentiment du préso !!!). Un conseil ,peut-être, pour Mr Vermeersch : démissionnez de la présidence et devenez directeur sportif à temps plein... ou faites appel à Tom Hanks !

Gardianul
Sâmbătă, 22 martie 2008
Autor: Cornel Ivanciuc

Résumé

Abdelkader, Saïd, Messaoud et Yassin, quatre soldats recrutés en Afrique du Nord, tentent au côtés des soldats français, de libérer la France de l'emprise Nazie.

Réputés pour leur courage, les quatres hommes sont envoyés au front, au côté d'autres soldats, tous africains.

C'est avec la peur au ventre mais bravoure, qu'ils vont se battre, pour l'amour de la France et l' envie de liberté... S'ajoute à ce combat une ultime difficulté: celle de se faire accepter et reconnaitre par les soldats français...

Pouquoi il ne faut le rater sous aucun prétexte?

Indigènes nous montre enfin une réalité longtemps bafouée, cachée par notre pays.

Avant de voir ce film, on ne s'imagine pas une seule seconde ce qu'ont endurés ces soldats. Et c'est uniquement après l'avoir vu que l'on prend conscience du mépris qui les touchaient à chaque seconde. Nous leur devons une grande partie de la victoire ; c'est d'ailleurs ce que tente de montrer Rachid Bouchareb en nous dévoilant le quotidien des soldats français d'Algérie. Un quotidien difficile, rythmé entre attaques allemandes, mais aussi agressivité française.

Ce film est une belle reconnaissance pour ces soldats oubliés, ces soldats "chair à canon"qui ont pourtant combattu avec le plus grand courage pour un pays qui ne les considérait pas à leur juste valeur... On ressent à travers lui, l'angoisse de la guerre, la peur de la mort, la tristesse du rejet, tout plein de sentiments qui ne nous laissent pas indifférents.

Si vous aimez les films historiques, tout particulièrement les films sur la seconde guerre, vous aimerez Indigènes, car il vous montre, de manière très touchante, le côté obscur de cette guerre, que nous croyons pourtant si bien connaître...

Galerie photos

Achat DVD en ligne

tot trimit bagaretii astia in seama de la putere trupe romanesti in Afganistan cand multe tari mult mai importante din UE si au retras trupele de ce oare noi trebuie sa fim atat de bagareti cand altii stau deoparte?

Normal pe baiatul asta o sa ziceti ca trebuia sa stie ce il astepata acolo si ca poate daca voia putea refuza plecarea . Ei bine nu i chiar asa daca refuzi te ia la ochi nenea colonelu si te trimite unde se atarna harta n cui sau incearca in scurt timp sa scape de tine ,ca soldat.Pur si simplu nu ai alta alternativa decat sa pleci.Asta e santaj pe fatza,bataie de joc.

Multi militari se bucura ca fac avere daca pleaca in Afganistan dar nu e asa ..fata de alte tari pretul e prea mic la riscul pe care ti l asumi acolo.Pentru cateva mii de euro sa pleci si sa vii inapoi mort eu zic ca nu prea se merita.Ma pish pe gradul de sublocotenent post-mortem si pe onorurile lor militare si nici nu mi ar pasa cata despagubire ar primi familia mea viata e mai presus decat orice ...iar din cer de acolo nu prea se aud onorurile militare si nici familia mea nu ar fi mai fericita si mai implinita.

Dumnezeu sa l ierte pe acest erou,luptator  Fruntasul Ionut Cosmin Sandu !!!!!

Lang Am n°7

Aymeric